

How the UN has Implemented Resolution 1325 in UN Peacekeeping Operations

by

Melissa Geiger

Bachelor of Philosophy in Politics and Philosophy, School of Arts and Sciences, 2009

Submitted to the Faculty of
University Honors College in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2009

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

School of Arts and Sciences

This thesis was presented

by

Lissa Geiger

It was defended on

April 10, 2009

and approved by

Macrina Lelei, Ph.D., University Center for International Studies, African Studies Program

Buba Misawa, Ph.D., Africana Studies, School of Arts and Sciences

Sherri Pataki, Ph.D., Psychology, Westminster College

Donald Goldstein, Ph.D., Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Copyright © by Lissa Geiger

2009

How the UN has Implemented Resolution 1325 in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Lissa Geiger, B. Phil.

University of Pittsburgh, 2009

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the United Nations' implementation of Resolution 1325 in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Seven criteria were derived from the Secretary General's Reports on Women, Peace, and Security: Peacekeeping Operations; Post-conflict Reconstruction; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence; Gender Balance; Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN Personnel; and Monitoring and Reporting. These criteria were applied to four case studies: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Each case study provides a description of the activities conducted and an evaluation for each criterion. The paper makes conclusions about the effects of specific characteristics of some of the cases and about areas in which the UN needs broader solutions. Specifically, suggestions are made for improved UN efforts in Gender Balance, Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN Personnel, and Monitoring and Reporting.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	IX
1.0 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY	3
1.2 CASE STUDY SELECTION.....	9
2.0 UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL).....	11
2.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.....	13
2.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	15
2.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION	19
2.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	21
2.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT.....	23
2.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	
BY UN PERSONNEL	25
2.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING.....	27
2.8 SUMMARY	28
3.0 UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC	
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC).....	32
3.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.....	34
3.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	37

3.3	DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION	41
3.4	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	43
3.5	GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT	46
3.6	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL	47
3.7	MONITORING AND REPORTING	50
3.8	SUMMARY	51
4.0	UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)....	55
4.1	PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS	57
4.2	POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	59
4.3	DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION	64
4.4	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	66
4.5	GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT	68
4.6	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL	70
4.7	MONITORING AND REPORTING	72
4.8	SUMMARY	73
5.0	UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT)	75
5.1	PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS	78
5.2	POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION	80
5.3	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE	85
5.4	GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT	88

5.5	PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL	90
5.6	MONITORING AND REPORTING	91
5.7	SUMMARY	92
6.0	CONCLUSIONS	95
	APPENDIX A : ACRONYM INDEX	102
	APPENDIX B : UNMIL GENDER BALANCE	104
	APPENDIX C : MONUC GENDER BALANCE	106
	APPENDIX D : MINUSTAH GENDER BALANCE	108
	APPENDIX E : UNMIT GENDER BALANCE	110
	APPENDIX F : ALL UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS GENDER BALANCE	112
	WORKS CITED.....	114
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	126

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1: Trainees of the UNMIL Office of Gender Affairs, Jan. 2005-Jun. 2006.....	14
Figure 2-3: UNMIL military, civilian, and civilian police deployment.....	24
Figure 2-4: Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel.....	26
Figure 3-1: Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel.....	48
Figure 4-1: Percentage of Women in HNP by graduating class	62
Figure 4-2: MINUSTAH military and civilian police deployment.....	68
Figure 5-1: PNTL recruitment and certification	84
Figure 5-2: Reports of Rape and Domestic Violence, by date	86
Figure 5-3: Gender Balance in UNMIT personnel	89

PREFACE

I would like to begin by acknowledging the support of my advisor, Don Goldstein. He has been a valuable consultant and advocate of my work, despite many differing opinions. It has been a pleasure to work with him. Additionally, this work would not have been possible without my loving family and friends who have supported me, encouraged me, and occasionally chastised me during my work on this paper.

A few notes on my sources and citations. The footnote numbers correspond first to the number of the work in my Works Cited and the second number to the page of the work. For example, 4-72 corresponds to the 72nd page of the fourth work in my Works Cited list. Following the Works Cited is a bibliography of all UN documents and sources which I examined in researching this paper. While not cited directly, all have been used in generalizations about UN reports, mission activities, and in formulating my conclusions.

Finally, I will discuss some assumptions and limitations of this paper. First, a few cautions about my semantics. I use the terms sex, gender, woman and female somewhat fluidly because most primary source U.N. documentation does not make distinctions in its use of these terms. For those who insist on clarification, it is fair to assume that these documents use essentialized assumptions that female is synonymous with woman or a feminine social position.

Considering the countries examined in this paper, this assumption is safe for a vast majority of the population. Although this is still not ideal for an academic paper that encompasses gender studies, there is not a clear alternative. For those who still wish to criticize my terminology, I will suggest that prior to progressive understandings of gender in post-conflict nations, it is necessary to have basic peace, stability, and development, especially for women. Thus, while it is possible that my analyses are incomplete because they overlook other categories of the population “gendered women” (children, the disabled, minority religious or ethnic groups, etc), this does not make the analyses or conclusions irrelevant.

Another term I use occasionally is “victim” – “victims” of violence, “victims” of rape, or “victims” or sexual abuse. To preemptively clarify, my use of the term is not meant to classify “victims” into any limiting categories. While victim is a role that describes many of the women in situations I am analyzing, by using it I in no way mean to suggest that this is all they are or all that they can be. Women who were victims still have great potential for empowerment to overcome their past experiences.

Next, some cautions about my methodology. My evaluation criteria are a mix of quantitative and qualitative assessments to measure if and how certain peacekeeping operations have achieved each of seven criteria. The only criterion that requires quantitative data is that of gender balance. However, I have provided quantitative data in other categories – such as the number of allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) made against UN personnel, or the number of women who participate in elections – in order to elucidate on particular points. In including these numbers, I am not using a formula such as “when the number of rapes in a country exponentially approaches zero” to calculate success or failure. Instead, the numbers are meant to indicate progress or lack thereof for particular programs.

Another potential critique of this work is that the UN is not an appropriate or ideal institution to conduct peacekeeping. While the UN has received its share of criticism, it is certain to continue peacekeeping operations in the future. Thus, whether the UN is the best institution to conduct peacekeeping operations or not, is not at issue here. Instead, research which assesses UN operations and isolates successes and failures is important because whether the UN is an ideal agent of international intervention or not, it does have the potential to learn and improve.

Finally, I will comment briefly on two potential limitations of this paper. First, while I am attempting to isolate and analyze the peacekeeping missions in each of four countries, they cannot truly be examined in a vacuum. With the increasing multidimensionality of peace operations and their coordination with various other UN agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and national and local governments, it is nearly impossible to attribute certain programs and their success or failure exclusively to the peacekeeping operation. When possible, I have attempted to indicate agencies or NGOs partnering with a peacekeeping mission. However, peacekeeping missions are complex webs of programs and institutions and the strings are not always transparent. Thus, discretion as to what constitutes a peacekeeping operation and what does not may limit some of my conclusions.

A second limitation is that all of the peacekeeping missions in this paper are ongoing at the time of writing. All of these missions will eventually end either because they have fulfilled their mandates, there is no longer domestic or international support for them, or the country has returned to violence. However, unlike other analyses of peacekeeping missions' success, my analysis is not based on the accomplishment of a mission's mandate. Instead, my analysis is of process, daily operations, and ongoing program decisions as opposed to a holistic assessment of

the mission and its end. Undoubtedly, future studies will be able to analyze post-1325 missions with a fuller picture of the pace of UN reform and its results. However, this paper is unique because it is able to look at the operations of missions during and immediately following Resolution 1325.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 2000, a silent revolution took place in the small chamber of the United Nations Security Council. After years of lobbying by governments, women's organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and countless hardworking individuals, the Security Council passed Resolution 1325. This document was the first time that the Security Council acknowledged the unique needs of women in conflict, peace, and security, the roles that women play in these situations, and the responsibility of the international community to work towards equality.

Unfortunately, in the months and years that followed Resolution 1325, the document was not placed on a pedestal, nor did it create major reforms of the inner-workings of the Security Council, the UN, or the nations who assented to the Resolution. While the Security Council's Resolution was monumental, it was merely words lacking commitment and political will. In subsequent years, the Security Council and United Nations system have barely begun to understand what their declaration requires. While Resolution 1325 has made waves throughout the UN system, particularly in agencies like United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), this author is interested in the effects it has had in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and within peacekeeping missions in the field.

While the UN's gender revolution happened, the DPKO was simultaneously undergoing changes of its own. Previously, in the early 1990's, the DPKO had experienced major expansions, followed by setbacks and recognition of limits to peace missions in the later part of the decade. Recently, the DPKO has begun viewing its operations in a new light – known as multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Multi-dimensional missions expand on the old methods of military monitoring and observing to include a holistic perspective of human rights and development as part of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Multi-dimensional missions include tasks such as humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, disarmament programs, the rebuilding of national institutions, support and training for local police, the rebuilding of justice systems, and support for democratic elections. Additionally, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions' mandates generally allow for a greater use of force, providing peacekeepers with more options to effectively maintain a secure environment and protect human rights.

The interaction of the changes within the Department of Peacekeeping and those caused by Resolution 1325 undoubtedly led to both some steps forward and some backward for women employed by the UN and women affected by UN peacekeeping missions. The rest of this chapter will do several things. First, it will provide background that explains Resolution 1325 and analyzes its development in UN documents through the year 2005. Second, it will explain the criteria that the UN developed for measuring the implementation of Resolution 1325 in peacekeeping operations. Third, there will be an overview of the case studies contained in this paper and an explanation of how they were selected. Specifically, the case studies evaluated in this paper are: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

Each case study has been evaluated in seven areas, all of which are explained in the following section, 1.1 Background and Methodology. This author's conclusions may be found in the final section of each case study chapter along with some summary conclusions in Chapter 6.

1.1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Resolution 1325's most significant contribution to the UN system was to establish the policy of gender mainstreaming. The UN defines "gender mainstreaming" as follows: "the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's, as well as men's, concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated."¹ After creating this important progressive concept, Resolution 1325 goes on to use language merely "recommending" that UN departments and member nations implement gender mainstreaming. While this weak language has led to slow or even non-existent implementation, Resolution 1325 is important because it contains essential definitions used by at least some UN agencies to make strides toward equality.

To more fully understand the significance of Resolution 1325, it is important to understand the development of UN policy on women's rights and gender equality. There are two major precursors to the DPKO's implementation of Resolution 1325. The first is the 1995

¹ 63-24

Beijing Declaration, produced at the Fourth World Conference on Women, which provides an international action plan on women's rights and equality. The Conference was attended by over 1700 representatives from 189 countries and territories, the United Nations and various NGOs. The Conference was the largest ever held by the UN and the Declaration is cited as the beginning of a new international feminist movement. The Declaration included seventeen points of action to eliminate discrimination against women, promote economic independence and sustainable development, ensure women's access to healthcare and education, and work towards peace and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. This broad Declaration was meant to apply to all governments and UN agencies.

The second precursor to Resolution 1325 that needs mentioning came from within the DPKO. In May of 2000, just four months prior to Resolution 1325, the DPKO's Lessons Learned Unit held a seminar on the topic of "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" in Windhoek, Namibia. This location gave the Windhoek Declaration and accompanying Namibia Plan of Action their names. The Namibia Plan of Action, the more detailed of the two documents, discusses nine areas of the peacekeeping process in which gender mainstreaming is needed and provides some guidance on how to accomplish this mainstreaming.

From the content of the recommendations, it was clear that the Namibia Plan of Action was closely aligned with the goals of Resolution 1325, passed in October of 2000. Unfortunately however, because of the previously mentioned vague and abstract language of Resolution 1325, the document did not engrave the Namibia Plan of into the UN system. Instead, it created the need for additional clarification. To the further frustration of women and women's advocates, these clarifications did not come quickly and were often packaged with additional vague

commitments. For example, each year around the anniversary of Resolution 1325 the President of the Security Council makes a statement reaffirming the Security Council's commitment to the Resolution's implementation. While these statements are positive, they are a ruse; their words fail to add weight to Resolution 1325.

Fortunately, there is one document series that did begin to really analyze Resolution 1325's implementation. A semi-annual series of Reports of the Secretary General on Women Peace and Security began in 2002. The first report outlined the ways that women were affected by war, conflict, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction, but did not discuss how the UN was reacting to these effects. Thus, it was not until the second Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace, and Security in October of 2004 that the UN specified how Resolution 1325 had been and should be implemented in peacekeeping operations. Unlike its weak and incomprehensive predecessors, the second report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace, and Security finally developed a system by which the UN and others could evaluate peacekeeping operations. The report classifies peacekeeping missions into eleven areas of operation:

1. Conflict Prevention and Early-warning,
2. Peace Process and Negotiations,
3. Peacekeeping Operations,
4. Humanitarian Response,
5. Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
6. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,
7. Preventing and Responding to Gender Based Violence in Armed Conflict,
8. Gender Balance in Recruitment,

9. Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence by UN Personnel,

10. Coordination, and

11. Monitoring and Reporting.

Slight variations on these eleven areas are used in the three subsequent Reports on Women, Peace, and Security in 2005, 2006, and 2007. This author has selected some of these criteria as well to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations. Because all 11 criteria do not apply to the DPKO and peacekeeping missions in the field, only seven of these criteria will be used. Below these seven criteria are explained based on the way the Secretary General analyzes each in the second and subsequent Women, Peace, and Security reports:

1. Peacekeeping Operations – While this criterion may seem repetitive, it refers to the operational aspects of the peacekeeping mission and the work of the senior gender advisor and her or his gender unit. Large initiatives that demonstrate the integration of mainstreaming at leadership levels or systematically throughout the mission fall into this criterion. The work of the gender advisor and unit may include: studies, gender analyses of policies and programs, advice and assistance to other units of the mission, development or provision of training, convening workshops for information sharing, working with local women's organizations, or running public information campaigns.

2. Post-conflict Reconstruction – This is the largest criterion in terms of the number of different programs this criterion encompasses. These activities include the development of women's leadership capacity and their inclusion in Truth and Reconciliation Committees, the electoral process, the transitional government, and a new or more permanent government at both national and local levels. Another big component of post-conflict reconstruction is the rebuilding of national police forces, their recruitment of female officers, and providing gender

sensitivity training for new police officers. Other justice system reforms under this criterion are efforts to facilitate prosecutions of human rights violators, especially those who have committed acts of violence against women, legal changes that promote women's equality, and increases in women's participation in the justice system. Finally, development projects targeting women, specifically Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) funded through the DPKO fall into this criterion.

3. Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) – Conducting thorough DDR programs that acknowledge the role of women as armed combatants or as individuals associated with fighting forces is essential to a mainstreamed DDR program. Recognizing the need for gender sensitivity in planning and training is one way to accomplish this. Gender sensitivity may include having separate facilities and female personnel to process female participants in the DDR program or including provisions for dependents of participants of the DDR program.

4. Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence (GBV) – One of the most horrific experiences of women in armed conflict is that of gender-based violence – from rape and sexual assault to sexual slavery or human trafficking. Because this is a way in which women are often uniquely affected by war and conflict (not to disregard the sexual violence or torture committed against men and boys), this criterion is frequently focused on for efforts to address the needs of women. Some of these efforts include providing training for peacekeeping personnel and local police forces to effectively investigate and elicit reports of GBV. Additionally, to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted, peacekeeping missions promote legal reforms and provide training to special investigators, prosecutors, and judges. All steps of enforcing national and international law on perpetrators of GBV and attempts to reduce overall instances of GBV are a part of this criterion. Finally, medical, legal, and psychological services for women who have experienced these crimes also count toward this criterion.

5. Gender Balance in Recruitment – Peacekeeping operations frequently lack women in all aspects of the missions – military units, civilian police personnel, and international and local civilian employees. This criterion is almost exclusively quantitative, although such quantitative records of gender disaggregated data are sparse and difficult to find. A smaller part of this criterion is the number of (universally so low as to be better phrased “the existence of”) women in high level leadership positions in the peace missions.

6. Responding to GBV by Peacekeepers and UN personnel – The United Nations has a zero-tolerance policy for acts of rape, GBV, or Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) committed by UN personnel. Even consensual sex between peacekeepers and the local population is strongly discouraged because of the imbalance of power between peacekeepers and the local population. Furthermore, the necessity of peacekeepers remaining neutral make even consensual relations suspect.² When these incidents do happen, they affect not only the individual abused but the legitimacy of the entire mission and all United Nations peacekeeping missions. In order to deal with and prevent instances of GBV by UN personnel, the missions’ activities are similar to and sometimes merged with methods and programs discussed in #4. UN personnel receive initial training on the zero-tolerance policy and occasionally update training, as well. Allegations of SEA are investigated by some combination of a Conduct and Discipline Unit and the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Furthermore, when SEA by UN personnel becomes a systemic problem, missions may implement additional prevention measures which are also a part of this criterion.

7. Monitoring and Reporting – The final criterion is the degree to which the Security Council is kept informed of the progress of gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations.

² 64-2

Through regular reports, end-of-mission evaluations, and the reports of the Best Practices Office, the inclusion of statistics, descriptions of programs for women, and mainstreaming successes and failures determine whether peacekeeping missions successfully accomplish this criteria.

Of the many possible aspects of each of the criteria listed above, no peacekeeping mission has done all of them. However, what will be considered in evaluating these cases is the actions each mission has taken in comparison with the scope of the problem being targeted and the success or failure of programs to achieve progress for women. Based on this general sense, each mission will receive an evaluation of adequate efforts, inadequate efforts, or no efforts on each of the criteria.

1.2 CASE STUDY SELECTION

There have been twenty-two peacekeeping missions that the United Nations has participated in since the passage of Resolution 1325 in October of 2000. Some of these missions began before this date and thus adopted mainstreaming efforts mid-way through the mission while others that began after this date had mainstreaming efforts integrated into the mission's initial planning. As it would not be practical to examine all twenty-two missions, three main criteria helped to narrowing the list:

1) Temporal significance – Only cases that have operated *primarily* post-Resolution 1325 will be analyzed. MONUC, UNMIL, MINUSTAH, and UNMIT began in 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2006, respectively. This time span provides me with data throughout the last eight years and should illuminate whether the UN has changed and improved at implementing mainstreaming over time. Although MONUC is the only mission which began before Resolution 1325 (seven

months prior), this difference should not be a factor in examining MONUC's operations after October of 2000.

2) Geographically representative – Gender inequity is a global problem for developed and lesser developed nations, Western, Eastern, European, Asian, African, Caribbean, and Latin American. By choosing operations in three different global regions – Africa, East Asia, and the Caribbean – it will be clear that that problems implementing mainstreaming are not constrained to any one continent and that different strategies are successful when peacekeepers recognize and respect national and cultural differences. Unfortunately, these differences also mean that a successful mainstreaming practice cannot and should not be immediately applied to every operation. Instead, the process of developing successful practices is what must be learned and shared.

3) Organizationally similar – Not all peacekeeping operations have full time gender advisors or gender units. Of the eighteen current UN peacekeeping missions, twelve have full-time gender advisors and six have gender focal points. However, operations with full time gender advisors show a basic commitment to the goals of mainstreaming and allow for an institutional mechanism to promote mainstreaming. Additionally, this criterion also filtered for missions that operate in the new style of multidimensional operations.

2.0 UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL)

The United Nations Mission in Liberia represents several firsts and significant accomplishments for mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions. From having the first all-female police unit to the only female Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in a peacekeeping mission, Liberia is often cited as evidence of gender mainstreaming's advancement in the department. However, even with these achievements, UNMIL still could use improvement in some areas. Before getting into this analysis, the following two subsections provide an abbreviated background of Liberia's conflict history and the situation of women in the country. After creating this setting, the rest of the chapter will discuss UNMIL's activities related to the seven criteria and evaluate UNMIL's efforts on each criterion.

*History*³

Liberia has experienced civil war on and off since 1989. In 1993, the Economic Coalition of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered a peace deal among the warring factions and a UN peacekeeping mission monitored the implementation of a peace deal and the election of former rebel leader Charles Taylor as president. While political parties struggled to bring about a stable government, the country had several years of relative peace. Civil war broke out again in July of 2003 among government forces and rebel factions. Once again ECOWAS

³ Information in this session taken from 17 and 79

helped broker a peace deal in August of 2003. This peace deal requested a second UN peacekeeping mission. Thus, Resolution 1509 created UNMIL in September of 2003. UNMIL's original mandate was to do five main tasks: 1) support the ceasefire agreement and assist in implementing a Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR) program; 2) protect UN staff, facilities, and civilians; 3) support humanitarian assistance and protect human rights (including "vulnerable groups" like women and children); 4) support security sector reform, including monitoring and restructuring Liberia's National Police Force (LNP) and military forces; and 5) assist the transitional government to restructure the administrative and government system, rebuild a national legal system and judicial and correctional facilities, and prepare for national elections to be held no later than 2005.

Women in Liberia

The problems facing women in Liberia prior to UNMIL were not that different than their post-conflict problems – low levels of education, lack of healthcare, and poverty. According to a 2000 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) publication, 47% of female heads of household had no formal education and 18.7% received only primary education.⁴ In healthcare, the government made very few attempts to address serious problems facing women such as HIV/AIDS, the inaccessibility of condoms, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), rape, or high maternal mortality (578 per 100,000 live births).⁵ During relative peace between 2000 and 2003, the Liberian government was working on a plan for poverty reduction which included a gender component. However, this plan ended abruptly when conflict again broke out in Liberia.⁶ Only

⁴ 62-4

⁵ 62-5

⁶ 62-2

two parts of the plan were accomplished – 1) trainings on gender equality for legislators, policymakers, and members of the judiciary and 2) the passage of a land law which allowed women to inherit land from their husbands and fathers.⁷

Another step the Liberian government took towards promoting women's equality was the creation of the Ministry on Gender and Development in 2001. The Ministry's broad mission incorporated aspects of gender mainstreaming in national policy and solidified international declarations on women's rights. For example, the Ministry helped promote the ratification and passage into law of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).⁸ However, the Ministry's activities were constrained by the ongoing violence throughout the country.

2.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Description

From the initial organization of UNMIL, a senior gender advisor position and a gender unit were created. Joana Foster filled the senior gender advisor position for several years; however, the position has been vacant since 2008.⁹ Regardless, the related gender unit is very active and the results of their work are visible in the DDR program, Liberia's elections, and campaigns against rape, GBV, and SEA. While these programs are analyzed in the relevant sections below, the use of the gender unit's expertise in many areas demonstrates that the

⁷ 62-2

⁸ 62-16

⁹ 128-N/A

operation has a culture which supports the use of mainstreaming. The gender unit is looked to as a source of support and advice and has support from others throughout the mission.

In addition to a progressive institutional culture, the gender unit has also made independent accomplishments. Their most significant contribution to the mission has been training programs for UNMIL personnel, government officials, NGOs, women's and civil society organizations, the Liberian National Police, the Liberian military, and Liberian justice system. UNMIL personnel, including civilian staff, civilian police, and military personnel, were trained on mainstreaming methods and conduct and discipline issues like SEA. Trainings throughout 2005 and 2006 broke down as shown in Figure 2-1. Note that the last line of Figure 2-1 refers to a train-the-trainer program in which the gender unit trained CIVPOL who in turn train other CIVPOL and LNP officers on gender during induction training.

Figure 2-1: Trainees of the UNMIL Office of Gender Affairs, Jan. 2005-Jun. 2006

Personnel Type	Total	# of women	% women
UNMIL national staff	301	84	38%
UNMIL international staff and CIVPOL	521	162	31%
CIVPOL trainers	26	12	46%

***Figures from the Office of Gender Affairs Achievements 2004-2006 Report**

If the pace of trainings continued in the trend shown in Figure 2-1, then UNMIL is disseminating information very effectively. However, more recent data to either support or contradict this possibility is not available. If these "routine" trainings ended in mid-2006, then UNMIL has failed thousands of other employees who may not have the knowledge and skills to mainstream gender in their daily work.

Other independent accomplishments of the gender unit are work with groups in the Liberian government and civil society. The gender unit helped the national government to develop a structure for gender issues similar to the UN's structure. Working with the Ministry of

Gender and Development, the gender unit established county gender coordinators in 14 out of Liberia's 15 counties and gender desk officers in all of Liberia's government ministries.¹⁰ UNMIL's gender unit also works with local women's organizations on projects ranging from women's involvement in the peace process to an action plan on sexual and gender based violence.

Evaluation

Ultimately, while the gender unit has not had any major failures, it also has not had major achievements. The unit functions as an integral part of the mission and its expertise is used by various other mission components. The unit has run trainings and worked with organizations outside of UNMIL to implement mainstreaming. Thus, on this criterion UNMIL has made just adequate efforts towards mainstreaming.

2.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Description

UNMIL conducted several reconstruction efforts in Liberia: supporting the elections, rebuilding the government and its administrative structure, forming the Liberian National Police and Liberian Armed Forces, rebuilding the legal and justice system, and development projects like roads, education facilities, healthcare facilities, and more. All of these projects mainstreamed gender with varying degrees of success. One of UNMIL's greatest successes was

¹⁰ 93-14

the 2005 elections. Women were represented in the election planning phase, as electoral staff as voters, and a few women became elected officials. In preparation for the elections, UNMIL lobbied the government during the drafting of the compromise bill on elections. However, this bill ultimately eliminated language about specific outreach to women.¹¹

UNMIL also worked with the National Electoral Committee (NEC) which was made of seven individuals, three of whom were women.¹² UNMIL ensured that voter handbooks and training manuals for members of the elections commission contained a gender perspective.¹³ Through these awareness measures and voter education programs, women registered to vote in numbers just exceeding registered men; 50% plus 50 additional women registered.¹⁴ UNMIL promoted women's involvement as polling staff, election observers, and candidates.¹⁵ An electoral guideline of the NEC stated that each party must have 30% of their nominees be women.¹⁶ Unfortunately, only one party met this threshold and the total percent of all women candidates was only 14%. In order to prepare female candidates for the election, UNMIL supported a workshop that included sessions on campaign planning, public speaking, public relations, working with the media, and the art of winning.¹⁷

The elections results did end in victory for 13 women legislators who make up 17% of the Senate and 14% of the House. To boost the impact of these women, UNMIL ran workshops following the election for female-elected officials.¹⁸ A second significant victory for women in the elections was Liberia's new president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. This election made Liberia the

¹¹ 90-9

¹² 10-7

¹³ 97-9 and 90-4

¹⁴ 47-1

¹⁵ 90-4

¹⁶ 10-7

¹⁷ 42-N/A

¹⁸ 90-15

first African nation to have a democratically elected female head of state. Of Johnson-Sirleaf's cabinet members, 31% are women.

Another aspect of reconstruction UNMIL worked on was improvements to the justice system. UNMIL worked on a penal reform development plan, part of which involved the issue of separate prison facilities for women and juveniles.¹⁹ While a requirement to this effect was on the books, a lack of infrastructure prevented this reality. One of UNMIL's QIPs addressed this issue in Monrovia Central Prison by renovating the bathrooms, toilets, and water system for both male and female blocks.²⁰ Progress beyond this one facility, however, has not been reported. To help relieve the burden on the prison system and bring justice to Liberian women, UNMIL, UNDP, and the Ministry of Justice hired five prosecutors to process exclusively gender-based violence and rape cases.²¹

As to the rebuilding of the Liberian National Police, UNMIL is supporting recruitment and training for police and specific programs for women. The LNP has a female police chief and a small number of female officers. In 2007, women made up 10% of the force with 361 women out of 3610 total officers.²² Because significant barriers prevent women from choosing a career as a police officer, UNMIL developed an education program to provide remedial high school education for women.²³ Once women in the program pass the high school examination, they can enter directly into the police academy. Beyond increasing the number of women in the LNP, further indication of the LNP's success is indicated by a June 2008 document on the increased reporting of crimes to the LNP. According to the UN Deputy Envoy for Rule of Law:

¹⁹ 85-8

²⁰ 48-N/A

²¹ 97-15

²² 120-5

²³ 49-5

“[Increased reporting] reflects the increased confidence and trust for reporting such crimes rather than being indicative of an increase in the actual crimes...Women are coming forward, and they are speaking out – this is especially significant when one examines the number of cases in which family and close friends are actually involved in the crimes.”²⁴

A final program LNP program developed by the UNMIL gender unit was a national Women’s and Children’s Unit to address issues of violence against these segments of the population.²⁵

In terms of infrastructure and development projects, UNMIL funded several programs through its QIP fund. One project funded the construction of a county office building for the Ministry of Gender and Development.²⁶ Another project built a Women’s and Children’s Shelter just outside of the capitol which WomenAid, a local NGO, now runs. The facility also provides skills training, adult literacy and learning, and temporary shelter for abused women and children.²⁷ Other ad hoc development projects include a program to promote economic opportunities for women in agriculture and business, a teacher training program for 600 primary school teachers (53% of whom were women), and a free medical clinic established by the Pakistani contingent of UNMIL (including female doctors and prenatal care).²⁸ While many of these QIPs do meet the needs of individuals in the population, there was no strategy or coordination among such projects to ensure that the needs of Liberian women and society as a whole were addressed systematically.

²⁴ 43-N/A

²⁵ 97-15

²⁶ 43-N/A

²⁷ 45-N/A

²⁸ 50-N/A

Evaluation

On this criterion, UNMIL's efforts have been inadequate. The training and support to women in the elections was important but produced few results. On a policy level, UNMIL was minimally involved in government actions following the elections. In the justice sector, the LNP invested resources into recruiting and training women, but is still short of having any substantial representation of women in its ranks. In the development realm, many projects directly benefiting women were funded, but there was no coherent strategy to ensure that women's most pressing needs were met first and integrated into the whole society's greatest needs. Clearly UNMIL is not making adequate efforts at mainstreaming on this criterion.

2.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION

*Description*²⁹

As another first for UNMIL, the mission's mandate on developing the DDR program was the first to include special attention to the needs of women and children.³⁰ The UNMIL gender unit had a heavy influence over the development of the DDR program. This program collected weapons and ammunition, housed former combatants for a short period, and provided money and the option of education, training, or employment. The gender unit's influence resulted in women and girls being recognized as armed combatants and permitted to participate in the program. Furthermore, women who were associated with fighting forces (or WAFFs) were allowed to participate, although the program originally was only for individuals who carried weapons.

²⁹ Information in this section from 60-N/A

³⁰ 86-14

Women associated with fighting forces included women and children who traveled with contingents as cooks, domestic servants, and sexual slaves. WAFFs were screened to confirm that they had been a part of the fighting forces. In cantonment sites women had separate living facilities. Additionally, the cantonment sites had gender-sensitive service providers, such as healthcare services for mothers of infants and nursing mothers. Other services included assistance in reproductive health, counseling, sexual trauma support, education, and training on women's rights.³¹

Unfortunately, opening the DDR program to women did not automatically lead to women's participation. Women and girls feared being stigmatized for participating in the program because an overwhelming number of participants were men. Thus, UNMIL made special efforts to reach out to women and make them aware of DDR services and their availability to women. The final breakdown of participants in the DDR program was 101,495 total with 22,370 (22%) women, 8,523 (8%) boys, and 2,440 (2%) girls. UNMIL estimates that of the eligible women, 51% accessed the DDR program along with 58% of eligible girls.

Overall, Liberia's DDR program has been successful in that the country has remained peaceful. However, the program was not without its flaws. Partially because of the inclusion of WAFFs and CAFFs (Children Associated with Fighting Forces), and partially because of a requirement allowing eligibility for certain quantities of ammunition instead of just weapons, UNMIL was overwhelmed by the number of DDR participants. The program was so overwhelmed that it was suspended for several months at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004. Even when the program began again, there were not enough places in employment, education, and other reintegration programs.

³¹ 76-6

Evaluation

The DDR program ultimately represents a program which had adequate mainstreaming efforts, especially in the planning stages. Unfortunately, the results for both women and men have been less than ideal. Regardless, UNMIL's efforts to include women who were affected by the conflict in various ways were significant. Furthermore, efforts to advertize the program to women and provide for women's needs in cantonment sites also reflect conscious mainstreaming efforts.

2.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Description

UNMIL's response to GBV in Liberia has been overwhelmingly focused on public information campaigns. Before describing UNMIL's efforts on this criterion, some statistics provide perspective on the scope of the gender-based violence problem in Liberia. According to a 2005 World Health Organization (WHO) survey, 91.7% of 1,216 women and girls interviewed stated that they were subjected to multiple violent acts during the conflict.³² Three quarters of these women and girls were sexually violated or raped. Even after the Rape Amendment Act was adopted by the Liberian government in 2006, the rates of rape and violence against women did not subside.³³ Furthermore, deficiencies in Liberia's legal system and the prevalence of out of court settlements prevent these cases from being dealt with in the criminal justice system.³⁴

³² 90-p. 9

³³ 120-10, 109-8, 105-8, and 102-7

³⁴ 120-10

To prevent and respond to these crimes, UNMIL's gender unit worked with the Liberian government and the Ministry of Gender and Development to write and pass the 2006 Rape Amendment Act which increased penalties for crimes of rape. Additionally, the gender unit assisted the Liberian Government to develop a National Action Plan on Gender. This plan includes the following five planks:

- 1) Strengthen the health sector to know how to respond to cases of Gender Based Violence and document clinical evidence;
- 2) Strengthen the capacity of the legal system to effectively and efficiently deal with cases of GBV;
- 3) Create a system of outreach, psychological support, and safe homes for survivors of GBV;
- 4) Train social and health professionals in the skills they need; and
- 5) Support economic and social empowerment of women and girls.³⁵

Although the plan is skeletal and lacks specific action steps and time tables, the broad goals are important steps for the Liberian government. If the plan is followed even minimally, there is great potential for progress on this issue.

Another way UNMIL responded to rape and GBV was the "Stop the Rape" campaign. This nationwide initiative coordinated by the gender unit had launch events in each county that featured concerts, actors, singers, comedians, and dramas. Performers at the events were celebrities from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, who contributed their names and faces to endorse an end to rape and violence against women.³⁶ Other public information campaigns on

³⁵ 27-1

³⁶ 46-N/A

GBV and SEA ran on UNMIL Radio in public service announcements and news features.³⁷

With the prevalence of radio as a means of communication in the country, these campaigns undoubtedly reached out to a diverse audience of listeners.

Evaluation

Ultimately, UNMIL makes inadequate efforts towards gender mainstreaming on this criterion. Unfortunately, most of the efforts of UNMIL on this criterion were in the area of “preventing” GBV, as opposed to “responding to” GBV. UNMIL’s efforts have done little to nothing for the women who have already endured GBV. Furthermore, while public information campaigns are important, concrete efforts like training or providing resources to victims or the justice system to promote prosecution of these crimes may be a better use of UNMIL’s time and efforts.

2.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT

Description

On this criterion, UNMIL has had both a few successes and some failures. UNMIL is frequently touted for having the only female SRSG of any peacekeeping mission. The SRSG is the top official in each mission country and the head of the political and military aspects of the peacekeeping mission. In terms of women in leadership roles, UNMIL does have some right to be proud considering it has both a female SRSG and a female Deputy SRSG. Support for

³⁷ 120-13

mainstreaming from these top levels has certainly contributed to Liberia's success in many of the other categories. Another reason Liberia is frequently praised for gender balance is that UNMIL had the first two entirely female civilian police units (both from India).³⁸ Again, UNMIL's mainstreaming efforts in areas like DDR and post-conflict reconstruction certainly benefited from the presence of these women.

Unfortunately, the overall gender balance of UNMIL does not reflect the accomplishments of women in leadership positions. A further disappointment in this criterion is UNMIL's lack of data on gender balance within the various mission components. The data that are available from 2004 and 2005 can be found in Figure 2-3.

Figure 2-2: UNMIL military, civilian, and civilian police deployment

Civilian Police, by date	Total Deployed	# of Women	% Women
December 2004	1104	66	6%
May 2004	640	32	5%
Civilian staff, by date			
December 2005	538	167	31%
June 2005	494	148	30%
March 2005	483	144.9	30%
September 2004	423	123	29.14%

Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General

In the reports containing numbers of civilian staff, there are no figures for military staff; however, the general trend in UN peacekeeping missions is that the proportions of military personnel are worse than those of the civilian police. In August of 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping began keeping tabs on the gender balance of military personnel in all missions. This data for UNMIL can be found in Appendix A. This data reflects women's participation of approximately two percent for the last two and a half years. This is certainly not reflective of a high commitment to gender balance.

³⁸ 51-N/A and 64-N/A

Evaluation

Both for the lack of recent data on civilian personnel and the poor balance in those data which do exist, UNMIL has made inadequate efforts at mainstreaming in this criterion. Despite women in two top leadership positions and the all female police units, including a few hundred women among thousands of men does not approach gender balance. Furthermore, using these women to mask the mission's overall lack of gender balance is even more outrageous.

2.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL

Description

While UNMIL has developed many responses to GBV by UN personnel, the unfortunate aspect of these efforts is that they have been greatly needed. While instances of SEA have decreased over time, in 2005, there were 45 allegations and in 2006 there were 30 allegations made against UNMIL personnel.³⁹ In 2007, there was a substantial decline to only 9 allegations.⁴⁰ While this shows some improvement (see Figure 2-4), even one of these incidents abuses the local population's trust enough that none are acceptable for a UN peacekeeping mission.

³⁹ 52-N/A

⁴⁰ 53-N/A and 55-N/A

Figure 2-3: Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel

Report Date	Number of Allegations, cumulative by year
March 2008	3
2007 Total	9
August 2007	7
March 2007	7
2006 Total	30
December 2006	28
September 2006	24
June 2006	18
2005 Total	45
December 2005	36
June 2005	21

Note: Figures from Reports of the Secretary General and UNMIL Press Releases

UNMIL has responded to the issue of GBV by peacekeepers in several ways. A free, 24-hour, confidential hotline was set-up for Liberians to report incidents of SEA by UN personnel. Additionally, a list of “off-limits” places for UNMIL personnel was created to ensure that UN personnel avoid locations known or reputed to condone prostitution, human trafficking, or narcotics use. When reports of SEA by UN personnel are received, UNMIL conducts independent investigations and personnel who have substantiated allegations against them are repatriated for disciplinary proceedings. Unfortunately, it took until 2006 for UNMIL’s Conduct and Discipline unit to be fully functioning; however the Office of Internal Oversight was processing cases prior to this date. UNMIL has released annual or biannual reports which track and report on allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse since 2006, although numbers were reported in a less formal press release in 2005.

Evaluation

Ultimately, UNMIL has made adequate efforts on this criterion. While during the first couple years of the mission this was a serious issue, many efforts have been made to address the problem. Especially in recent years, the number of allegations has decreased significantly. Additionally, UNMIL has taken steps to address issues as they have arisen and successfully completed numerous investigations.

2.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING

Description

The main indication of UNMIL's mainstreaming efforts is that nearly all reports of the Secretary General since December of 2004 include sections on "gender". These sections describe the work of the gender unit and major advances or setbacks for women and girls. The first report of the Secretary General in December 2003 lacked a section on "gender", while the May and September 2004 lacked a "gender" section but integrated gender reporting under other headings in the report. Curiously, the March 2004 and March 2006 reports also lack a "gender" section and lack any information on mainstreaming efforts. This reporting, while generally showing progress also has several curious inconsistencies.

A second problem with the report of the Secretary General is the level of detail that they contain. Even when women are mentioned, it is usually brief and appears to be the result of an individual compiling the report, not a systematic process. Other times when women are mentioned it is in "features", meaning that press releases or reports will sporadically include information on a successful program or organization, instead of including data on women

regularly in reporting on all programs. Finally, data in areas such as gender balance and allegations of SEA, or gender disaggregated data in the DDR program, does not exist.

Evaluation

On this criterion, UNMIL has made inadequate efforts towards mainstreaming. Inconsistencies in reports of the Secretary General are one reason UNMIL's efforts are inadequate. Additionally, the missing data on gender balance DDR participants is especially troubling in evaluating the mission. Finally, the lack of genuine representation of gender policies as integral to programs themselves, rather than a fulfillment of "separate" gender requirements shows the UNMIL's efforts on this criterion are not adequate.

2.8 SUMMARY

Peacekeeping Operation	Adequate
Post-Conflict Reconstruction	Inadequate
DDR	Adequate
Preventing and Responding to GBV	Inadequate
Gender Balance	Inadequate
Preventing and Responding to GBV by UN personnel	Adequate
Monitoring and Reporting	Inadequate

The most unique failure of UNMIL is in the area of reconstruction and development. The UN is clearly grappling with what role the DPKO should play in development. Historically, and still today, other UN agencies like UNDP and UNIFEM, the World Bank, and a plethora of NGOs play large roles in development in Liberia and other post-conflict nations. This is

certainly the case in Liberia where many outside agencies, including large grants from the United States, are funding the country's reconstruction. However, because each of these organizations have their own goals, directives, and limitations, development is not always addressed systematically, either by the UN or collectively by all development agencies in a country. The only institutional support for development within peacekeeping operations currently is QIP funds. Although there is no official definition of what these funds should be used for, they are generally used for small-scale infrastructure projects with immediate impacts for the population. However, development is not the DPKO's strength.

Yet, peacekeeping personnel are frequently in a unique position in terms of understanding a country's security situation; a situation which must be intertwined with development programs.⁴¹ Thus, using the resources of the peacekeeping missions to fill a greater role in development planning has potential to both foster effective development and ensure that development plans are mainstreamed to address the needs of women. While some countries have effective planning bodies within UN agencies or other organizations, Liberia is an example of a country in which such central planning has failed to bring success. Developing peacekeepers' roles in development planning would allow peacekeeping missions to fill voids like this in other countries.

Another unique program of UNMIL was the DDR program, and this program is notable for its success. This DDR program was the UN's first with a specific gender sensitive mandate, and is a potential model for other missions. The inclusion of women as participants, the provision of services in separate facilities for disarmament and demobilization, and the listening to women's voices in reintegration programs were all important characteristics of the DDR

⁴¹ For more on this, see 26 and 29

program's success. However, due to varying post-conflict situations, simply creating a program identical to UNMIL's in other countries may not work. The reason mainstreaming was successful in UNMIL's DDR program was because the Office of Gender Affairs and local women were involved in planning and were able to communicate local women's needs to the plan. This participatory stage is a characteristic that is essential to apply in other programs.

A second reason that this DDR program shows such promise for other countries is that UNMIL overcame significant challenges. The program was suspended for several months because it was overwhelmed and could not provide proper security for program participants. However, after the suspension, the program continued as planned. Other missions that experience significant security challenges have viewed mainstreaming as a perk or a bonus when it is possible. Instead, Liberia makes a strong case for mainstreamed DDR programs being integral not just for women but for the peace and security of an entire country.⁴²

Another criterion on which UNMIL struggled to respond adequately was that of GBV. Writing about a trip to Liberia in mid-2008, AIDS activist Stephen Lewis said: "at the heart of this conference there lies an unassailable truth: if sexual violence is not addressed during the course of a conflict, then sexual violence will haunt the post-conflict period, and make of the ostensible peace a mockery for half the population."⁴³ UNMIL's main strategy to respond to the issue was through many kinds of public information campaigns. A 2007 report of Action Aid recommends several actions in which UNMIL could improve its response: legal and judicial interventions, training on gender sensitivity for UNMIL staff, central standardized reporting section, capacity building for women's organizations, sensitively discouraging customary law practices, increasing support of LNP through human resources and funds, further training on

⁴² For more on this, see 59

⁴³ 16-N/A

women's rights for UN civilian police and LNP, training for legal personnel especially on the new rape law, and support for the prison system.⁴⁴ Essentially, these recommendations reflect that while public information campaigns are an important part of a long-term strategy, more pragmatic tactics are required in the short-term.

Despite the difficulties UNMIL had responding to GBV in Liberian society, the mission was one of only a few successful in addressing the issue of SEA by UN peacekeepers. The steady decrease of incidents from 2005 through 2008 is unique. Not only was UNMIL tracking and reporting on this important data, but the numbers show results! There is likely no one program or factor that caused this accomplishment. Several measures could have influenced the success, including: limits on where personnel could travel, training sessions, and the influence of the gender advisor. Furthermore, having women in UNMIL's top two leadership positions who are committed to ending SEA by UN personnel certainly also had some influence over results. Thus, there may not be one formula for success in this category, but a broad approach to mainstreaming and gender sensitivity across the entire mission is essential.

Ultimately, UNMIL's evaluations reflect average success at mainstreaming within a peacekeeping operation. UNMIL was effective on some criteria and ineffective on others. Overall, the influence of the institutional culture (as reflected by success on the first criteria), allowed the mission to overcome obstacles on other criteria. However, many areas are in need of greater mainstreaming attention. Consider this program as a model of mixed success in moving through the next three case studies.

⁴⁴ 14-2

3.0 UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC)

Of all the countries examined in this paper, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has the most ongoing violence and perhaps the worst reputation. The conflict and humanitarian situation in the country, even since the start of MONUC, is horrendous. As usual, women bear the brunt of the problems – rape by armed forces, rape by UN Peacekeepers, poverty, and forced displacement. While MONUC has begun to address some of these problems, because basic peace and security do not exist, many of MONUC’s mainstreaming efforts have been hindered or subordinated to security tasks. Specifically, MONUC’s operates more like a 20th century observer mission than a modern multi-dimensional operation. The mission’s activities are highly concentrated in monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations which frequently include incidents of rape or violence against women and civilians. Because MONUC is struggling to document and deter these crimes, other mandate components like DDR, reconstruction, and development are lacking in mainstreaming efforts.

*History*⁴⁵

In 1996, many diverse groups in the DRC were sparring over resources and national and ethnic sovereignty. The main nations participating in the conflict were Rwanda, Uganda,

⁴⁵ Info in this section from 6 and 66

Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola. In 1997, Laurent Kabila's Tutsi forces, supported mostly by Rwanda won control of the capital city Kinshasa. Kabila then declared himself President. Many foreign forces refused to leave and fighting flared up again in 1998. In July 1999, all six countries came together to sign the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. The UN's involvement in the DRC conflict began with a limited force of ceasefire monitors. In February of 2000, UN Resolution 1291 established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or MONUC.

MONUC's original mandate included activities such as: monitoring and assisting with the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, supervising troop redeployment and a program for DDRR, facilitating humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring (with particular attention to "vulnerable groups" like women and children), and developing a demining program.

Women in the DRC

Women in the DRC were very organized on issues of equality prior to MONUC operations. A workshop hosted by MONUC in 2003 summarized the history of women in the DRC as having "evolved from one of full participation before the colonial era to one of marginalization in the colonial era leading to powerlessness, to almost total exclusion from decision-making levels."⁴⁶ Despite this current exclusion, women did have rights prior to the civil war. There was a gender equality law and women had the right to vote and the right to own and inherit property. Unfortunately, some women did not experience these rights because other laws and traditional practices within families, the markets, and village councils contradicted the

⁴⁶ 41-6

equality laws.⁴⁷ Women who were not restrained by these factors organized and advocated for themselves and for the DRC's peace process. During the ceasefire negotiations, women's organizations held simultaneous dialogues about how to enhance their roles in the peace process. Over 150 women's organizations in Kinshasa organized around the peace process.⁴⁸ The Women's Network for the Defense of Rights and Peace in the Kivus organized despite threats from local police. Their office was raided and their peaceful demonstrations were disrupted and disbanded as a "security threat".⁴⁹ Clearly, women in the DRC were motivated and ready to take part in all aspects of the DRC's society.

3.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Because MONUC was created prior to Resolution 1325, there was a slight lag in the implementing of mainstreaming. MONUC's gender unit was created two years after the start of the mission and seventeen months after Resolution 1325 in March of 2002. The unit was staffed by one senior gender advisor, her deputy, two UN volunteers, an administrative officer, and two local officers.⁵⁰ The first gender advisor was Amy Smythe of Sierra Leone. Since the creation of the gender unit, UN reports have not included much information on the unit's activities. The unit published a 2003 Activities Report which describes the first year of the gender unit's work. The report expresses the unit's two-pronged strategy as follows:

⁴⁷ 22-1272

⁴⁸ 22-1275.

⁴⁹ 22-1275.

⁵⁰ 28-N/A

“The first prong was to integrate a gender perspective within MONUC itself. The second was to work with the Congolese population and society to bring the realities of the conflict as they especially affect women, to the attention of decision makers in the peace process and the Transition.”⁵¹

The gender unit pursues this strategy without its own budget. This is a special challenge because, unlike in UNMIL, the gender advisor had to work to explain her role and earn commitment from the mission’s leadership. In fact, traveling to various MONUC offices to meet field staff was the majority of the senior gender advisor’s work during the first several weeks and months of the unit’s operation.⁵²

Although the unit has two-fold mission, a much greater proportion of their work is external mainstreaming. The 2003 report of the gender office’s activities is primarily a summary of the gender advisor’s meetings with various civil society groups (e.g. schools, universities, churches, women’s groups, and NGOs) throughout the country. This networking is important, but the gender unit needs to follow up with parties to ensure they are implementing programs and policies that support women. Externally, the gender unit worked with local women’s groups and civil society institutions. The gender unit has supported these groups by organizing and participating in several conferences for women leaders. With the unit’s support, women’s groups have organized marches and demonstrations to commemorate International Women’s Day and other days of recognition for women. Working with Réseau Action Femmes, MONUC’s gender unit prepared a campaign against violence against women.⁵³ The gender unit also helped women to lobby for a voice in the peace process and in government and electoral

⁵¹ 28-N/A

⁵² 28-N/A

⁵³ 77-12

politics. Finally, the gender unit advocated for DRC Universities to offer seminars on CEDAW.⁵⁴

The main internal activity of the gender unit is running trainings for UN personnel. The gender unit recognizes the importance of holding these trainings systematically in order to reach all MONUC personnel.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, reporting on these trainings has not been included consistently in progress reports of the Secretary General. A 2005 report of the Secretary General stated that, by the end of that June, 400 members of all UN units will have received the induction training.⁵⁶ While perhaps systematic, this total is low compared to the over 15,000 civilian, military, and civilian police personnel deployed in the country. One consequence of the failure to train more staff is a failure of mainstreaming in other programs and high numbers of rape and SEA by UN personnel.⁵⁷ Another training program emblematic of MONUC's failure on this criterion was a United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) seminar requested by the MONUC gender unit. This optional training on women and their human rights was highly rated by participants, but had low attendance (only 101 participants).⁵⁸

Another, smaller task of the gender unit is public information campaigns. The unit has accomplished this by partnering with the UN radio station, Radio Okapi. At the urging of the gender advisor, the station has taken steps to include coverage of women and women's issues on the station. Some mainstreamed programs include interviews of women and women's organizations participating in the peace process, a program on the kinds of violence against

⁵⁴ 77-12

⁵⁵ 28-N/A

⁵⁶ 89-15

⁵⁷ For more on this, see section 3.6

⁵⁸ 123-3 and 123-10

women, and a series on women's legal, economic, and social post-conflict needs.⁵⁹ Additionally, for International Women's Day 2004, a public information video on sexual violence against women was produced.⁶⁰

Evaluation

In this criterion, MONUC has made inadequate efforts in mainstreaming. In particular, there is not an organizational culture that supports the gender unit and gender mainstreaming. The gender advisor and gender unit have accomplished much; especially the strong network of relationships with many women's and civil society groups. However, without the support of the mission's top leadership, the gender unit is limited in their actions. Internal mainstreaming activities or even attempts are non-existent because there is no strong example of effective use of the gender unit's expertise. Furthermore, the internal mainstreaming and trainings that the unit has attempted have failed to produce results. For these reasons, MONUC receives inadequate marks in this criterion.

3.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Description

In this criterion, MONUC is at a much earlier stage than most of the other missions because of the lack of peace and security in the country. Despite this, MONUC has made mainstreaming efforts in the national dialogue, the truth and reconciliation committee, the

⁵⁹ 41-12

⁶⁰ 84-16

elections, the justice system, and development. In preparation for the national dialogue, women organized in Nairobi, Kenya in 2002 and developed the Nairobi Declaration. This document included a plea for peace and demands that the new Constitution include CEDAW (already ratified by the DRC in 1986) and other mainstreaming efforts like affirmative action, quotas for decision-making bodies, prosecution for rape, and access for women to land and resources. The declaration also demanded that gender sensitivity be mainstreamed throughout the peace process and that the facilitator of the national dialogue incorporate the Nairobi Declaration into the dialogue.⁶¹ However, these demands were not easily granted. Although MONUC's gender unit lobbied to include women, ultimately women made up only 10% of the participants.⁶² MONUC responded to this injustice by training women and then smuggling them into national dialogue sessions as "experts". MONUC's efforts allowed 34 women to participate as delegates and an additional 34 as experts.⁶³

Following the 2003 dialogue process, the DRC began developing their transitional constitution and transitional government. This process did not allow for significant levels of women's participation. Although Article 51 of the transitional constitution stated that women should have "meaningful representation", this was not the case. Women in the transitional government were represented as follows: 6/36 Ministers, 2/25 vice ministers, 2/8 National Assembly members, no Senate members, and 1/8 members of the Independent Electoral Commission.⁶⁴ Attempts to include women in the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections did result in a few more women serving.

⁶¹ 20-N/A

⁶² 23-9

⁶³ 28-N/A

⁶⁴ 78-15

Perhaps MONUC's most significant contribution to post-conflict reconstruction has been their work to involve women in the electoral process. While occasionally ineffective, MONUC did create some mainstreaming initiatives. During the drafting of the DRC's new constitution, MONUC coordinated civic education programs with local and international partners especially targeted at women.⁶⁵ However, in terms of percentages, the 2006 election still resulted in poor representation of women; women became 9/60 (15%) total government officials, 42/500 (8.4%) National Assembly Members, 5/108 (4.6%) Senators, 43/690 (6.2%) Provincial Assembly members, and 1/22 (4.5%) governor or vice governors.⁶⁶ Once the new government was in place, MONUC remained minimally involved in government policy. The mission is working with the government to develop a national plan on 1325 and MONUC is reviewing women's rights legislation to ensure that it conforms to international standards.⁶⁷

In the justice system, MONUC has assisted with the implementation of prison reform. Following the war, the DRC's prisons were in shambles. In some cases, prisons shut down because of their inability to provide food or basic security for prisoners. In other cases, the prison director is forced to allow prisoners to roam the town and forge for their own meals, lest they starve to death.⁶⁸ Lack of an effective incarceration system caused war criminals and rapists to continue to pose a threat to civil society. Additionally, female prisoners, including pregnant and nursing mothers, did not have separate prison facilities. Not only did these women lack privacy, but their personal security was also threatened by the male prisoners and rapists whom they were imprisoned with.⁶⁹ MONUC was able to advocate for the female prisoners and

⁶⁵ 108-8

⁶⁶ 113-3

⁶⁷ 113-14

⁶⁸ 9-N/A

⁶⁹ 74-7

help build the infrastructure for separate female units in one county prison.⁷⁰ MONUC also used QIP funds to rehabilitate prisons in Lubumbashi, Kindu, Kinshasa and Kisangani.⁷¹ Another aspect of the justice system MONUC has worked with is the new police force in the DRC. Specifically, the gender unit has provided training and training on gender sensitive issues. In 2002, MONUC had a train the trainers program in which MONUC trained trainers in the local police forces to effectively disseminate gender sensitivity information.⁷²

Finally, MONUC has conducted a few development projects for women in the DRC. One program for female journalists trains women in the methods of journalism. The program's goal is to eventually make these women leaders and role models for other girls and young women.⁷³ A second MONUC development project that targets women is the revitalization of the healthcare system. MONUC recognized a serious need for healthcare facilities and so the mission's third QIP was a healthcare center with labor and delivery facilities.⁷⁴ However, MONUC neglected to create a systematic, mainstreamed plan for reconstruction projects.

Evaluation

Unfortunately, the failure to create a systematic, mainstreamed plan affected many of MONUC's efforts on this criterion. Although the reconstruction activities of the mission as a whole are reduced, efforts that have been made have no overarching plan. In the elections, MONUC had some success at reaching out to women voters, but there were many groups involved in these efforts and few details on MONUC's program. In the government and justice

⁷⁰ 21-N/A

⁷¹ 98-10

⁷² 75-12

⁷³ 126-N/A and 129-N/A

⁷⁴ 4-N/A

system, MONUC's efforts were generally quick fix solutions that have few demonstrable or long-term effects. Thus, MONUC's efforts on this criterion are inadequate.

3.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION

*Description*⁷⁵

MONUC's mandate included the development of a DDR/DDRR program. MONUC's original intention was to make the DDRR program a model in gender-sensitivity.⁷⁶ However, despite a commitment from the highest levels towards this goal, basic failures in implementation have caused problems and challenges for the DDRR program's gender sensitive components.

The DDRR program first faced the challenge of incorporating women who made up approximated 15-20% of the Congolese army.⁷⁷ In addition to women affected by the DDRR process as armed combatants, women were affected if they participated in non-combat roles for armed militias, or if their husbands or heads of household were combatants. However, since the beginning of the DDRR program, women were hesitant to approach DDRR staff and begin the demobilization process. Schroeder lists a few possible reasons for this including: MONUC's DDRR staff does not reflect gender balance, the classification system is subjective causing women dependents or non-combatant support-staff to fail to qualify, or dependents not receiving separate consultations or assistance for their reintegration or repatriation needs.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ For a full gendered analysis of this program, see 23

⁷⁶ 72-4

⁷⁷ 22-1273.

⁷⁸ 23-11, 23-17, and 23-20

Once women are accepted into the DDRR program, they may face further challenges. For example, the lack of interpreters of local languages prevents women from reporting sexual abuse that they have experienced.⁷⁹ Beyond that, demobilization centers and repatriation camps do not always have separate facilities for women and children. Furthermore, the economic integration programs that exist for women are more frequently “token” programs than a systematic approach to reintegration for women.⁸⁰ Finally, in the repatriation process, women can be “forced” either through economic dependence or societal pressures to travel to their husband’s home country.⁸¹

Evaluation

Ultimately, MONUC again makes inadequate efforts on this criterion. While a portion of this failure was out of MONUC’s control, other simple mainstreaming tasks are absent. Clearly, more resources are focused on basic peace without including gender concerns - the antithesis of mainstreaming. Despite challenges of ceasefire violations and ongoing violence, MONUC can do more.⁸² Having interpreters and separate consultations and facilities for women is a basic necessity that has been included in many other DDR programs. Thus, it is not only that MONUC’s ability to pull together a DDR program for the thousands of combatants has been inadequate, but also their mainstreaming efforts within that program.

⁷⁹ 23-19

⁸⁰ 23-26

⁸¹ 23-30

⁸² 60 describes an interesting program called the Disarmament and Community Reintegration Program (DCR) in Ituri under the Dar es Salaam Act. This program targets communities as a whole without distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants and thus provides benefits with a holistic approach.

3.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Description

This criterion is perhaps the biggest part of MONUC's gender work. Unfortunately, this focus is critical because of the prevalence of rape and sexual exploitation in the DRC. From 2005 to 2007, 14,200 cases of rape were recorded.⁸³ In the first six months of 2007 alone, there were 4,500 sexual violence cases reported (meaning at least that many cases went unreported as well).⁸⁴ Rape in the DRC is perpetrated most frequently by members of various armed forces. An investigation in 2007 stated that: "in South Kivu and the Ituri, while non-state armed groups remain the main perpetrators of sexual violence, close to 20% of all cases of sexual violence are reportedly committed by the FARDC and the PNC."⁸⁵ Members of the Congolese national military (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police (PNC) are occasionally held accountable, but are reluctant to hand over senior officers.⁸⁶ In other situations, perpetrators avoid accountability by making outside settlements, receiving bail without a court date, or receiving light sentences.⁸⁷

A 2006 report of the Secretary General identifies several of the challenges to addressing GBV in the DRC: the country is geographically large, the immense extent of rape by the armed forces is compounded by rape in civil society, it is difficult to reach child victims, and the majority of perpetrators go unpunished.⁸⁸ For example, of the 14,200 cases between 2005 and

⁸³ 130-N/A

⁸⁴ 9-N/A

⁸⁵ 9-N/A

⁸⁶ 107-11

⁸⁷ 114-10

⁸⁸ 106-13

2007, only 287 of them were taken to court.⁸⁹ For perpetrators that are convicted, sentences for GBV and rape are frequently lenient and the deficient prison system exacerbates the lack of consequences for rapists. A 2006 law on sexual violence attempted to increase convictions by raising the age of minors from 14 to 18, making sex with a minor illegal, and raising penalties for rape and sexual harassment. The law also attempted to address corruption by outlawing political immunity for sexual crimes. The government's commitment reflected in this law is significant; however, rape continues to be a widespread problem.⁹⁰ In March of 2008, MONUC held a workshop to make women aware of these changes and their rights.⁹¹

Instead of enforcing laws on GBV, MONUC has focused on documenting violations and engaging in limited awareness-raising programs. One of the first attempts to address the issue of GBV was in 2002 when the gender unit began discussions on a plan of action to address violence against women, especially in the east of the country.⁹² They began a comprehensive study in 2004 on the issue.⁹³ The following year, a Sexual Violence Working Group was formed and developed training and advocacy packages which were distributed to the Congolese military, police, and judiciary.⁹⁴ The working group also began a review of Congolese law on the issue of sexual violence.⁹⁵ MONUC attempted to address the problems with the legal system by holding trainings for lawyers and magistrates beginning in 2005.⁹⁶ In April 2008, a training session was held for 200 military magistrates and judicial police inspectors on how to properly investigate

⁸⁹ 130-N/A

⁹⁰ 113-9

⁹¹ 15-N/A

⁹² 75-12

⁹³ 84-12

⁹⁴ 98-13

⁹⁵ 98-13

⁹⁶ 91-10

and prosecute sexual crimes.⁹⁷ An additional 300 people are set to be trained. Finally, in 2008 an additional UN senior advisor was deployed to the country to collect and analyze data and develop a national plan.⁹⁸

Another set of MONUC programs were QIPs targeted at women who experienced GBV. One program provided assistance to 1,000 survivors of GBV and trained local NGOs and women leaders on preventative measures.⁹⁹ Two years later, MONUC conducted a joint initiative to document reports of GBV and coordinate NGO partners on medical, legal, and psychosocial support.¹⁰⁰ Another program on International Women's Day 2004 created a thirty minute video on sexual violence against women and distributed the program to local media sources.¹⁰¹ However, MONUC programs still have a problem because female victims who receive either medical or psychological support do not receive legal assistance.¹⁰²

Evaluation

While sexual abuse and gender based violence are still problems in the DRC, this is one area in which the mission has effectively used the expertise of the gender unit and implemented programs to address the problem. MONUC has committed a large number of resources – human, programmatic, money, etc. – to address this issue. Studies and other monitoring are ongoing and MONUC recognizes the gravity of the situation. Furthermore, by cooperating with NGOs, MONUC has made efforts to provide for victims of these crimes. Thus, MONUC has made adequate efforts on this criterion.

⁹⁷ 115-12

⁹⁸ 118-16

⁹⁹ 84-15

¹⁰⁰ 106-11

¹⁰¹ 84-16

¹⁰² 115-11

3.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT

Description

MONUC has an exceptionally poor record in this criterion. Gender balance within MONUC staff is hardly documented, while the records that do exist reflect poorly on the mission. A 2003 report of the gender advisor indicates that the gender balance is in fact getting worse.¹⁰³ Furthermore, there has not been any real effort to change this fact. Gender disaggregated data is available for only one year in reports of the Secretary General. In 2004, women made up 4/117 civilian police, 31/736 military observers, and 146/10,008 military units.¹⁰⁴ The civilian police statistics from 2003 are particularly troubling - before June 2003, 1 out of 15 CIVPOL officers were women, by June 9, 3 out of 69 officers were women, and in October 3 out of 90 officers were women.¹⁰⁵ A consequence of these statistics is that “victims, usually female, have repeatedly intimated that the sight of a male officer in uniform makes them re-live the experience of the violation all over again.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, the lack of gender balance has consequences in at least two other criteria – preventing and responding to GBV and preventing and responding to GBV by UN Peacekeepers. Appendix B contains the data on MONUC military personnel from August 2006 through January 2009. Unfortunately, the percent of women reflected in this data is generally just under two percent and never about even 2.5%.

Women in leadership roles fair just about as well as those in the rest of the mission. In the gender affairs office, the senior gender advisor is a woman. In 2008, Leila Zerrougui, a woman from Algeria, was appointed as a second Deputy SRSG for MONUC. However, adding

¹⁰³ 28-N/A

¹⁰⁴ 84-15

¹⁰⁵ 28-N/A

¹⁰⁶ 28-N/A

one additional woman does not change the overall poor gender balance. Whether or not this addition will affect any of MONUC's programs in the other criteria may be a positive side benefit.

Evaluation

MONUC has made no efforts in this criterion. The mission has not kept data on the mission's deployment, but the data that does exist indicates extreme disparity. Furthermore, even once the problem was recognized, no additional recruiting programs were created.

3.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL

Description

As in all UN peacekeeping operations, MONUC enforces the UN's zero-tolerance policy on SEA. Unfortunately, MONUC personnel have blemished the UN's reputation on peacekeeper conduct with many cases of SEA by peacekeepers. Accusations have risen into the hundreds, as shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1: Reports of Sexual Assault and Abuse by UN personnel

Report Date	Number of Allegations	Number of Convictions
July 2008	?	4
April 2008	?	6
November 2007	?	11
March 2007 (reports 2006 totals)	176	?
December 2005 (for Dec. 04-Oct. 05)	167	78
September 2005 (for Dec. 04-Sep. 05)	?	25
August 2005 (for Dec. 04-Jun. 05)	77	46
December 2004 (for Jun.-Sep. 04)	72	8

Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General

These numbers have drawn the attention of UN leadership and NGO and media reports. In February of 2005, the Secretary General issued a special letter stating:

*The unconscionable conduct of a small number of peacekeepers now clouds this distinguished record of collective achievement and individual sacrifice. I have stated publicly my personal outrage at the revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse of Congolese children and women by some United Nations personnel assigned to MONUC.*¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, a Human Rights Watch investigation uncovered that

*MONUC personnel have been involved in a pattern of sexual exploitation of Congolese women and girls. We interviewed girls, some as young as 13-years old, who had been raped by MONUC soldiers. We also spoke to girls aged between 12 and 15 who engaged in what is commonly called “survival sex”—sexual relations they entered into in order to get some food, money or protection.*¹⁰⁸

Clearly, the prevalence of SEA by UN peacekeepers is an endemic problem which has seriously affected the reputation of MONUC and UN peacekeeping as a whole.

¹⁰⁷ 88-1

¹⁰⁸ 125-N/A

The original plan for dealing with personnel issues was a four-step rapid response action plan: 1) investigation, 2) deterrence, 3) an emergency taskforce, and 4) a public relations and information campaign.¹⁰⁹ However, after the publicity MONUC received for its failures in this area, additional action plans were developed in 2005 around standards of conduct, the complaint mechanism, support and assistance for victims, and training.¹¹⁰ In addition, a network of SEA focal points throughout MONUC offices was reactivated.¹¹¹ Also in 2005, an office for addressing SEA in MONUC was formed. This unit continues to work with the Office of Internal Oversight Services which investigates allegations made against MONUC personnel. Unfortunately, the OIOS has been inefficient and delayed investigations, allowing for a culture of impunity.¹¹²

In addition to bureaucratic changes, MONUC has addressed the problem of SEA through a variety of trainings. Conduct and discipline training on SEA is included in induction training for all MONUC personnel. In 2006 two train the trainers programs were held to train 40 new training officers.¹¹³ Other attempts at concrete solutions to SEA have included a curfew for UN personnel, fencing and lighting around UN facilities, and the requirement that personnel wear their uniforms at all times to prevent individuals from masquerading as anonymous civilians and committing acts of GBV or SEA.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ 81-8

¹¹⁰ 91-14

¹¹¹ 108-15

¹¹² 113-15

¹¹³ 107-13

¹¹⁴ 89-14

Evaluation

Fortunately, many of MONUC's more recent efforts have been successful at reducing the number of conduct issues. However, the amount of time, years in fact, that it took for MONUC to respond to these issues reflect very poorly on their efforts towards mainstreaming on this criterion. Furthermore, the lack of follow-up on many convictions and the tolerance MONUC had for these crimes is unacceptable. While MONUC has improved significantly, its efforts on this criterion are inadequate.

3.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING

Description

Reports of the Secretary General on MONUC have an inconsistent representation of women. When women are included, they are frequently depicted as victims or as a "vulnerable" demographic in need of protection.¹¹⁵ SEA and GBV are mentioned fairly consistently, but the reports are similarly formatted – a report of an incident or incidents, the number of people affected, and the legal action taken, if any.¹¹⁶ The number of reports in this repetitive format does draw attention to violence against women, but unfortunately they lack solutions or an adequate response by MONUC.

In addition to the negative coverage women receive in these reports, important mainstreaming information is missing. The only mainstreamed programs that are included are those involving GBV or SEA. In other areas like the mission's deployment, the DRC's new

¹¹⁵ See 67-4, 73-8, 77-12, 89-10, etc.

¹¹⁶ 72-10, 84-10, 81-8, 81-10, 81-11, 81-32, 82-13, 94-6, 94-11, 89-11, 89-14, 98-11, and 106-4

police force, or the participants in the DDRR program sex-disaggregated data is missing. The office of gender affairs released only one report over five years ago! Ongoing documentation of gender programs is severely lacking.

Evaluation

For the significant absences of data and the poor coverage of women when they are included, MONUC again has made inadequate efforts towards mainstreaming. While some information about women is included, this does not document important mainstreaming programs or their results. Additionally, descriptions of women as a “vulnerable group” in ways that are limiting and dismissive are not acceptable.

3.8 SUMMARY

Peacekeeping Operation	Inadequate
Post-Conflict Reconstruction	Inadequate
DDR	Inadequate
Preventing and Responding to GBV	Adequate
Gender Balance	None
Preventing and Responding to GBV by UN personnel	Inadequate
Monitoring and Reporting	Inadequate

MONUC’s overall record is very poor – with only one criterion on which the mission has adequately attempted mainstreaming efforts. If MONUC conveys one message with regard to mainstreaming in peacekeeping it is this: despite UN commitments to mainstreaming and human rights, these concerns are secondary to establishing basic peace. Because rebel factions and

foreign militias are still operating in the DRC, MONUC has focused on documenting ceasefire violations and gauging commitment of various factions to the peace process. Conducting community development and empowerment, especially empowerment of women, is not seen as an effective route to peace. Unfortunately, this view directly contradicts many of the platforms of Resolution 1325, including:

*Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.*¹¹⁷

Undoubtedly one of the greatest influences over MONUC's commitment to mainstreaming is the overall ineffectiveness of the operation's culture and the gender unit. In MONUC, some ideas about the incorporation of women and gender issues predated Resolution 1325; however, the mandate and the creation of a gender unit occurred several months after the mission's origin. It is possible that this contributed minimally to the failure of some of MONUC's mainstreaming efforts. According to the 2008 Women, Peace, and Security Report:

*The incorporation of gender perspectives from the inception of a mandate has proven to be crucial. Gender advisers participated in inter-agency assessment missions conducted prior to the establishment of the mandates of operations in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia, which resulted in a better reflection of gender issues in reports submitted to the Security Council prior to the establishment of peacekeeping operations in these four countries and translated into explicit references to gender issues in the ensuing Security Council resolutions.*¹¹⁸

However, once the gender unit began working, MONUC's leadership did not modify its ideologies, programs, or mission priorities. This lack of support from the leadership forced the gender unit to cooperate primarily with external organizations and thus contributed to failures on

¹¹⁷ 71-1

¹¹⁸ 86-7

other criteria. As described in the 2003 Report of the Office of Gender Affairs, “skepticism, which was exhibited at the outset when the OGA was inaugurated, is slowly giving way to a readiness to listen and get involved in the process of reflection and analysis by many staff members.”¹¹⁹ This displays that there was a period of at least a year before the gender office even began gaining interest and support from the rest of the mission.

Secondly, the DRC is the country with likely the worst reputation and reality of rape by armed factions – both local parties and UN personnel. While the UN should more easily be able to handle the conduct of its own personnel, women actually requested that the UN focus on rape by others. A Haitian woman quoted in a 2004 Human Rights Watch report says: “yes it is true that some girls have been raped by U.N. soldiers, but so many more have been brutally raped by other armed groups. Please focus on stopping this as it brings us so much more pain and suffering.”¹²⁰ MONUC has indeed followed this advice. The gender unit has used resources to document the problem of rape and GBV in civil society and provided resources to victims and legal and policy advice. While incidents are still occurring, MONUC has begun the long process of raising-awareness and bringing about societal change.

In terms of addressing violence by UN personnel, action was taken much too late after a culture of impunity allowed the problem to multiply. As the 2004 Human Rights Watch report affirms, “Staff will only realize that such behavior has consequences if the U.N. leadership shows resolve in dealing with the problem.”¹²¹ As in UNMIL, other factors contribute to the mission’s success or failure in this category – however, in MONUC other factors were more negative than positive. Lack of leadership commitment to the issue and lack of gender balance

¹¹⁹ 41-14

¹²⁰ 125-N/A

¹²¹ 125-N/A

both also fostered MONUC's failures in this area. Although recent data is not available on the issue, neither are reports that the problem has been effectively addressed. Suggestions for solutions to these issues – gender balance, monitoring and reporting, and preventing and responding to GBV by UN personnel – will be discussed in Chapter 6.

4.0 UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)

Moving out of the African continent, in Haiti there is a conflict of a different nature. Haiti's conflict results from political instability and years of changing regimes and illegitimate elections. The security threats are violent urban gangs as opposed to large rebel militias. Despite the differing cause and manifestation of conflict, the challenges faced by women are not drastically different; Haitian women too face challenges of gaining recognition and leadership roles in Haitian society. Unlike MONUC, MINUSTAH began gender mainstreaming efforts in the mission's planning stages. While this has had benefits to the mission internally, externally, MINUSTAH has still faced challenges in areas like the Haitian elections and responding to GBV.

*History*¹²²

Haiti's conflict began after the country's first democratic elections in 1990 which brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. A coup the following year removed Aristide from power leading to a series of elections throughout the 1990's. These elections were challenged as illegitimate by various members of the international community, in particular the United States, France, and Canada. Between 1994 and 2001, four UN peacekeeping missions operated in Haiti. In 2000, Aristide returned from exile in the Central African Republic and claimed to have won

¹²² The information in this section comes from 11 and 80

the election despite voter turnout under 10%. Following this election, CARICOM, Canada, the EU, France, the O.A.S, and the U.S. mediated an action plan in January of 2004. Under this plan, Aristide remained President. However, armed opposition forces gained enough strength, to cause Aristide to resign. He was replaced according to the Haitian Constitution by the President of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexendre. Just months later, in April 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti began.

MINUSTAH's initial mandate included three major activities – creating and maintaining a secure and stable environment, supporting the political process, and monitoring and promoting human rights. These broad goals included the more specific tasks of restructuring the Haitian National Police (HNP) and providing them with training (including gender training), a comprehensive DDR program for all armed groups (including women), assisting the transitional government in national reconciliation, supporting democratic presidential and parliamentary elections that all citizens (including women) participate in, and protecting the human rights of women and children. This comprehensive mandate is laudable, especially because it mentions specific attention to women in areas other than human rights and protection. Whether this act of linguistic inclusion led to greater commitment to mainstreaming issues will be examined in the following sections.

Women in Haiti

Prior to MINUSTAH, women in Haiti were making institutional progress towards equality. Haiti ratified international human rights conventions with implications for women such as CEDAW in 1981 and, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women in 1997. In 1994, the government established the

Ministry of Women's Affairs. Women's organizations like Fanm Yo La, the Lambi Fund, and others were in operation prior to MINUSTAH, and the mission built on the strength of these groups. The major problems facing women in Haiti were correlated with Haiti's high poverty rates, poverty being more likely to affect women. Specifically, women-headed households experience poverty rates of 26% in the suburbs and 64% in urban areas, compared to rates of 17% and 48%, respectively, for male-headed households.¹²³ One partial explanation for this discrepancy is that women have difficulty getting salaried jobs. Another related explanation is women's rates of education and literacy. Although school enrollment rates do not reflect major disparity (45.3% for girls and 46.6% for boys between the ages of 6 and 24), literacy rates do. Only 48% of women are literate, while the rate for men is 61%.¹²⁴ Despite these challenges, women in Haiti are organizing, and, with the support of MINUSTAH, mainstreaming efforts are slowly trickling into Haitian society.

4.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Description

The MINUSTAH Gender Affairs Unit was created at the mission's inception. In 2004, the MINUSTAH gender unit included a senior gender advisor and a national program officer while recruitment for additional personnel was ongoing.¹²⁵ The senior gender advisor was Nadine Puechguirbal, formerly a gender advisor for MONUC. The unit's main projects have been training programs, ending violence against women, and promoting women's participation

¹²³ 32-77

¹²⁴ 32-97

¹²⁵ 25-2

in the elections. Some of the unit's training programs were induction trainings on gender issues for the first MINUSTAH staff members. These sessions at the beginning of the mission were particularly helpful because all staff could consider mainstreaming at the beginning of their projects. This has specific impacts on mainstreaming in the DDR program and the elections planning program, as will be evident in the following sections. Unfortunately, after the mission's initial stages, the amount of time allotted for induction training has been limited. Furthermore, these trainings now must incorporate SEA information in addition to gender sensitivity information.¹²⁶ A second shortcoming of the trainings is the inability of the gender unit to train military units stationed outside of the capitol Port-au-Prince. Despite these added challenges, an interesting accomplishment of MINUSTAH's induction training is that sessions are run by a Haitian male program officer. This is an accomplishment because, as one civilian police trainee commented, "he was glad to hear a 'real man' deliver such a course instead of a woman...it gave the course more credibility."¹²⁷

A second project of the gender affairs unit has been working towards a National Plan of Action to combat violence against women. To create the plan, the gender unit has collaborated extensively with other UN agencies, Haiti's Ministry of Women's Affairs and Rights, and local women's groups.¹²⁸ These relationships have led to productive networking for future mainstreaming endeavors in civil society. The gender unit has provided training and capacity-building for women and assisted with advocacy efforts of women's associations. For example, the gender unit partnered with UNIFEM and two local groups – Famn Yo La and the Center for Commitment, Responsibility and Capacity Building (CERAC) – to develop women's leadership

¹²⁶ 25-3

¹²⁷ 25-2

¹²⁸ 121-10

through a coaching program for women leaders.¹²⁹ In another project, the unit has assisted a network of Haitian men to create an NGO for men that conduct grassroots advocacy on cultural changes that respect women.¹³⁰

Evaluation

Ultimately, there are few concrete programs to evaluate on this criterion. The most significant – training – has faced significant setbacks. However, the overall culture of the mission, as will be clear from the activities listed in the following categories (post-conflict reconstruction, DDR, and preventing gender based violence), is one that places mainstreaming as a high priority in decision-making. Furthermore, the external network of the gender unit and the seeds it has planted in local organizations is an important resource, though often overlooked because it is outside the scope of the mission mandate. Thus, on this criterion MINUSTAH succeeds at making adequate efforts towards mainstreaming.

4.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Description

For this criterion, MINUSTAH conducted mainstreaming in the electoral process, governance, the justice system, and development. Of all these areas, MINUSTAH's most serious investment in mainstreaming has been in the political and governmental realm. MINUSTAH's support to Haiti's police force and for human rights of prisoners has been

¹²⁹ For the full report on this program, see 1

¹³⁰ 103-9

minimal. Desperately needed development programs have been neglected by MINUSTAH in favor of programs run by other UN agencies and NGOs. Regardless, mainstreaming has been considered in most of these areas.

For the legislative and local elections in 2006 and 2007, MINUSTAH and the gender unit were heavily involved in the electoral process and developing women for political careers. On a policy level, MINUSTAH influenced the elections code to better include women. In support of recommendations from local women's organizations, MINUSTAH supported a recommendation to offer a 2/3 reduction in the fee to register a candidate for any party that had at least 30% female candidates.¹³¹ This recommendation was accepted and implemented by the Provisional Electoral Council. Additionally, MINUSTAH held discussions, albeit unsuccessfully, with the Electoral Council about quotas for women in elected offices.¹³²

On a grassroots level, MINUSTAH held a five-day training session on "women in leadership" to promote women's involvement as candidates.¹³³ Additionally, two intensive weeklong courses covered topics like peaceful conflict resolution; communication; planning; project development and implementation; public speaking techniques; and current events. Following these trainings, the participants formed a support network called "The Network of Women Candidates to Win" supported by MINUSTAH and run through Fanm Yo La.¹³⁴ In addition to trainings, MINUSTAH attempted to raise awareness of female candidates and voters through a weekly radio program.¹³⁵

¹³¹ 92-11

¹³² 83-6

¹³³ 96-2

¹³⁴ For more info on programs preparing women for political careers, see 1

¹³⁵ 96-3

Despite MINUSTAH's efforts to support women candidates, the results of the elections were not particularly impressive. While women's participation as voters and candidates was higher than ever – 48.59% of the electorate was female – results do not reflect this accomplishment.¹³⁶ In national elections, 4 of 30 (13.3%) elected senate members were women and 4 of 99 (4%) deputies. Locally, 25 of 420 (5.9%) elected mayors were women, an improvement from the six women mayors elected in 2000.¹³⁷ While improving, these proportions make clear that women still have a much greater role to play in Haiti's government. A session from before the elections in 2005 identified the following barriers to women's participation: women are afraid of violence, they lack funding to carry out electoral campaigns, they have responsibilities as a woman head of a household, they lack policy incentives, and they lack training.¹³⁸

Fortunately, MINUSTAH is working to break down these barriers by continuing efforts after the elections to increase women's participation in the political process. MINUSTAH has helped to create a Gender Working Group on the Promotion of Women's Political Rights.¹³⁹ Additionally, MINUSTAH continued its pre-election trainings with Fanm Yo La for female candidates. The second phase of the training program offered ongoing mentoring for successful women candidates or women who wished to maintain their political careers. The women participated in individual coaching sessions and were required to implement community projects. The goals of this program were to continue building capacity for women to address the gender

¹³⁶ 1-13

¹³⁷ 1-13

¹³⁸ 39-N/A

¹³⁹ 121-10

disparity in elected positions and to develop bonds between elected women, their constituents, and local women's organizations.¹⁴⁰

In the justice system, MINUSTAH's main work was developing and training the HNP. HNP officers have had joint trainings with UN Civilian Police on gender mainstreaming issues. Additionally, the HNP established a gender focal point network throughout the force whose members also receive training from MINUSTAH trainers. To plan for future projects within the HNP, a needs assessment was conducted in 2004 by female UN civilian police officers.¹⁴¹ In 2005, MINUSTAH piloted a program that improved police station facilities specifically for women victims of violence.¹⁴² In terms of gender balance within the HNP, male-to-female ratios are slowly improving. Currently, approximately 10% of the HNP is women and the percent of women in each graduating class is slowly increasing over time [See Figure 4-1].

Figure 4-1: Percentage of Women in HNP by graduating class

Graduating class # and date	Class size	# of women	% women
20 th class, began July Aug. 2008	700	84	12
19 th class, begin Jan. 2007	600	30	5%
18 th class, began July 2006	578	27	5%
17 th class, graduated Sept. 2005	778	35	4.5%
16 th class, ongoing May 2005	368	15	4%
15 th class, graduated Jan. 2005	200	15	7.5%

Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General

In other parts of the justice system, improvement in gender balance is needed. Of the 700 magistrates, 45 (6.4%) of them are women and two of the 25 (8%) Justices of the Peace are women. Gender parity in all aspects of the justice system has been strongly advocated by MINUSTAH's gender affairs unit.

¹⁴⁰ For details about the participants, their projects, and personal testimony, see 1

¹⁴¹ 83-5

¹⁴² 95-7

Another aspect of the justice system MINUSTAH is involved in is human rights of prisoners, especially female prisoners. MINUSTAH has provided human rights officers at police stations and detention centers to give special attention to female detainees. In 2008, approximately 325 of the 7,530 inmates nationwide were women.¹⁴³ Unfortunately, despite MINUSTAH's attention, there are still cases of ill treatment women receive in Haitian prisons. In 2005, an investigation by a coalition of North American peace and justice organizations called "Let Haiti Live" uncovered women being unconstitutionally held for longer than 48 hours without seeing a judge and refused access to judges because they were unable to afford a lawyer. Some women had been abused, beaten, or raped while in custody.¹⁴⁴ Other women had children who were abandoned as a result of their arrest because they were a head of household or their husband was arrested with them.¹⁴⁵ As a small condolence, MINUSTAH reported in 2007 that they successfully lobbied for the release of 150 individuals, including pregnant women and minors, illegally held in pretrial detention.¹⁴⁶ Regardless, a more systematic approach to this issue is needed.

In terms of development projects, MINUSTAH has not reported any projects specifically targeted at women. Some healthcare programs include women, although they are coordinated through UNFPA and are only tangential to MINUSTAH. In one instance, MINUSTAH troops directly provided medical consultations and medicine to the local population, which included care for women. However, detailed information on MINUSTAH QIPs is not available.

¹⁴³ 116-9

¹⁴⁴ 8-6

¹⁴⁵ 8-6

¹⁴⁶ 110-11

Evaluation

On this criterion, MINSTAH's record is inconsistent, but on the whole it is adequate. MINUSTAH has had many shining programs in the realm of women's political participation, both in gaining helpful policies and in training women to participate. However, women's actual success in elections was unimpressive. In the security sector, the gender balance in the HNP is very progressive compared to some other forces and the gender focal point network is a valuable asset. Unfortunately, this network and the trainings for the HNP have not been particularly successful.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the lack of development programs for women is troubling. However, MINUSTAH's overall efforts on this criterion were adequate.

4.3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION

Description

MINUSTAH's DDR program is unique among UN DDR programs for several reasons. First, Haiti has many armed gangs with no clear political agendas. The rebel factions are not simply pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide, but urban gangs that coexist with civilian communities. Second, Haiti's gun control laws allow individuals to possess a personal weapon to defend one's self and one's home. Therefore, total disarmament of the civilian populations is not possible. Third, the DDR program was not begun until 2006 in order for MINUSTAH to focus on other priorities such as the elections and developing the police force.

¹⁴⁷ Section 4.4 will elaborate on this.

To address these anomalies, Security Council Resolution 1702 (2006) authorized MINUSTAH to create a Comprehensive Community Violence Reduction Plan. This mainstreamed plan acknowledged women's role as perpetrators and victims of violence and provided opportunities for women to participate in the DDR program.¹⁴⁸ Women are participants in elected bodies that make up the DDR program. The first type of local body is the Community Development Committees (CDCs) which require women participants. The second, Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (CVPDs), are elected from the members of the CDCs. These bodies analyze conflict in their communities and identify activities to reduce conflict. Once the community violence reduction program was organized, women were accepted as armed combatants at Reinsertion Orientation Centers (ROCs) and provided with separate and secure facilities. Women then received reintegration benefits for themselves and beneficiaries in their immediate family. Specifically, reintegration services include vocational training and job placement or business management training. At the end of 2008, the DDR program was scheduled to begin providing skills training to 1,000 participants, 300 of whom were women, and three months of vocational training to 1,200 participants, 400 of whom were women.¹⁴⁹

As a result of the mainstreamed DDR program, MINUSTAH's gender unit conducted a study which led to a greater understanding of women's experiences and stigmas they encountered as armed combatants, rape perpetrators, and rape victims. The study made recommendations to the DDR program to address these issues. The recommendations were: focus on rebuilding the entire community structure, allow communities to identify and manage

¹⁴⁸ 61-N/A

¹⁴⁹ 116-6

threats against women, and include women in community-based projects like the CPVD instead of the traditional DDR program.¹⁵⁰

Evaluation

Some information missing in this criterion is the number of participants, especially gender disaggregated numbers. Thus, assessing the program is a challenge. However, the creation of quotas for women in the community-based planning committees and the availability of the program to women all show efforts in mainstreaming. Other gender sensitive DDR programs have not included women in key planning stages as substantively as MINUSTAH has. Finally, conducting a study to evaluate the gender sensitivity of the program is particularly laudable. Thus, MINUSTAH has made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming in this criterion.

4.4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Description

In this criterion, MINUSTAH struggles to implement adequate programs. To define the GBV problem in Haiti, a 2008 report of the Secretary General stated that physical domestic violence is the most commonly reported form of violence against women, followed by sexual violence.¹⁵¹ Statistics from 2004 and 2005 show an increase in the number of women and girl victims of violence received by NGOs and law enforcement.¹⁵² In addition to violence against women, several sources indicate that child rape is a problem with over 50% of rapes (and by one

¹⁵⁰ 61-N/A

¹⁵¹ 121-10

¹⁵² 104-12

account 72% of rapes) involving minors. Some of the conditions which allow for such high rates of GBV are tolerance of the HNP and lack of government investigation into cases committed by the HNP. As a 2006 Amnesty International report observes, “abuses committed by HNP officials were committed with impunity. Investigations into most police violations, when conducted, did not meet international standards. Prosecutions and convictions for human rights violations were non-existent.”¹⁵³ Additionally, women do not report GBV crimes due to low confidence in the justice system and fear of retribution.¹⁵⁴

MINUSTAH has made small efforts to deal with the problems of violence against women. In February 2005, MINUSTAH participated in a workshop to define a national strategy on violence against women. Owing to the high rate of child rape, MINUSTAH partnered with the Haitian Coalition for Child Rights to run an awareness campaign that included issues of sexual abuse and child prostitution. The gender unit has collaborated on the 2005 National Plan of Action to combat violence against women. This plan promotes more efficient data collection, increasing support services for victims, and cooperation between women’s organizations, NGOs, and the government.¹⁵⁵ MINUSTAH is also a member of the National Coordination Committee on the Prevention of Violence Against Women. Unfortunately, the work or accomplishments of many of these organizations are not available. Other documented efforts MINUSTAH has made to prevent and respond to these crimes are: establishing a database to collect statistics on Violence Against Women, training the members of the HNP, and disseminating information through the HNP on women’s rights and the crimes of rape and domestic violence in schools.

¹⁵³ 2-N/A

¹⁵⁴ 3-6

¹⁵⁵ 3-22

Evaluation

Considering the scope of the problem posed by GBV, MINUSTAH has not made adequate efforts on this criterion. Holding workshops and collecting statistics can not be effective unless followed through with appropriate legal, enforcement, and service program changes. In Haiti, this has not been the case. MINUSTAH has been wrapped up in bureaucratic solutions with no results. Instead, reports of GBV have increased following MINUSTAH's presence in the country and the mission has hardly begun to acknowledge the problem.

4.5 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT

Description

Data on MINUSTAH's deployment is scattered and only began being reported regularly within the past year. The numbers that do exist, displayed in Figure 4-2, are not extensive enough to determine any trends. However, they certainly do not reflect mainstreaming efforts as none of the figures approach gender parity in either the military or the civilian police division.

Figure 4-2: MINUSTAH military and civilian police deployment

Police Deployment, by date	Total Deployed	# of Women	% Women
August 2008	874	52	6%
March 2008	894	45	5%
October 2004	409	15	4%
August 2004	240	5	2%
Military Deployment, by date			
August 2008	6825	127	2%
March 2008	6938	127	2%
October 2004	3092	34	1%
Civilian Staff, by date			
October 2004	667	105	16%

Note: Figures from Reports of the Secretary General and Puechguirbal?

The data assembled by the DPKO on military personnel is available in Appendix C. Similar to the table above, women have made up just fewer than 2% of military personnel. There have been few increases in the number of women deployed over time, again reflecting few mainstreaming efforts.

Nadine Puchguirbal, the senior gender advisor, acknowledged this problem in an interview, stating, “these figures do not reflect the requirement of expanding the role and contribution of women in peacekeeping operations as stipulated in Resolution 1325 (2000).”¹⁵⁶ Women in leadership are similarly non-existent. In addition to the gender advisor, one woman is the head of MINUSTAH’s political component, but other members of the mission’s leadership are male.

Evaluation

From these figures, it is clear MINUSTAH has made no efforts on this criterion. The problem is acknowledged by the gender advisor, but no additional programs have been implemented. Furthermore, this lack of effort has likely had a negative impact on other criteria.

¹⁵⁶ 25-4

4.6 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL

Description

In this criterion, reports of SEA are not nearly as extreme as in other missions. On the contrary, there have been no reports of GBV by UN personnel. Lack of allegations has meant that reports of the Secretary General do not keep running tallies as in other missions or mention the conduct issue at all. Unfortunately, an absence of reported incidents has not comforted the Haitian population. A 2005 report of Refugees International reports just the opposite. In the report, a Haitian woman is quoted saying, “the [civilian police] who patrol our neighborhood don’t do anything. They are only interested in talking to women. These women are not prostitutes who talk to them but they are hungry. They will sell their bodies for money.”¹⁵⁷ A Haitian man observes, “we’ve seen an increase in prostitution since MINUSTAH came. In 1994, we had a lot of problems with the Multinational Forces. The [peacekeepers] bring their bad habits with them to Haiti, but they do not bring change.”¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, international media have covered incidents of UN peacekeepers from MINUSTAH being repatriated for SEA-related violations.¹⁵⁹

It is extremely troublesome that the NGO, local population, and international media are well aware of the issues, and yet reports of incidents are non-existent in UN documents. One partial explanation for the lack of reporting is that despite the creation of a Code of Conduct Officer to receive reports of abuse by peacekeepers, the position is vacant. Currently, the senior

¹⁵⁷ 19-1

¹⁵⁸ 19-1

¹⁵⁹ 5-N/A

gender advisor has taken on the role in addition to her other responsibilities.¹⁶⁰ This is not an excuse to avoid addressing and reporting on this problem.

MINUSTAH addresses the issue of SEA by peacekeepers through the application of the basic prevention formula. The zero-tolerance policy is explained and enforced through training provided to all categories of mission personnel and all new staff. There was a training for managers on a 2008 Bulletin of the Secretary-General about the prohibition of discrimination, harassment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority.¹⁶¹ The gender unit has conducted awareness campaigns for MINUSTAH personnel and the Haitian public. In 2005, posters raising awareness were hung in all mission offices.¹⁶²

Evaluation

In this criterion, MINUSTAH has not made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming. If there were no instances of SEA, then the mission should be celebrating. However, it is clear from international media reports and local perceptions that there is nothing to celebrate. Thus, the mission must develop a better program for prevention and work to provide transparent reporting on the conduct and discipline of its personnel.

¹⁶⁰ 19-2

¹⁶¹ 116-14

¹⁶² 95-10

4.7 MONITORING AND REPORTING

Description

MINUSTAH's reports on gender mainstreaming are inconsistent and of poor quality. In reports of the Secretary General, sections on gender or discussion of gender issues in any section are included occasionally, but with no clear pattern or trend. Furthermore, even in instances where gender is mentioned, the reports rarely provide significant information or details on programs. Ironically, MINUSTAH press releases included women and the activities of the gender unit more frequently during the first year of the mission which since have disappeared. Currently, press releases and reports mention women only in passing or as a part of "vulnerable groups". Even the mission mandate mentioned attention to "vulnerable groups" like women.¹⁶³

Evaluation

Clearly, with such little reporting that exists, MINUSTAH has made inadequate efforts in this criterion. Some evaluation documents do exist, such as the gender unit's assessment of the DDR program and an HIV/AIDS knowledge report of the peacekeeping best practices unit. However, substantial and integrated reporting is lacking, especially in reports of the Secretary General. Furthermore, data on DDR participants, gender balance, and GBV by peacekeepers is missing.

¹⁶³ 80-4

4.8 SUMMARY

Peacekeeping Operation	Adequate
Post-Conflict Reconstruction	Adequate
DDR	Adequate
Preventing and Responding to GBV	Inadequate
Gender Balance	None
Preventing and Responding to GBV by UN personnel	Inadequate
Monitoring and Reporting	Inadequate

MINUSTAH is another peacekeeping operation with mixed success. The mission's most impressive program was its re-tooled DDR program ("comprehensive community violence reduction plan") which was participatory and included women at all stages. Allowing a local community, including the women of the community, to identify its own threats is empowering and effective. The gender unit was integrally involved in planning and implementing the program, especially through the initial gender trainings for all mission staff. This demonstrates an effective culture of gender sensitivity and mainstreaming.

In some ways, MINUSTAH can be seen as a post-GBV mission. During the initial implementation of Resolution 1325 and mainstreaming, peacekeeping missions simply invested resources into GBV and SEA issues in order to satisfy mainstreaming guidelines. Having a gender advisor formerly from MONUC (where GBV and SEA are major problems in civil society and by UN personnel), this type of approach seemed even more likely. Unfortunately, while caution about the over-emphasis on SEA and GBV is important, MINUSTAH seems to have fallen to the other extreme of lacking attention to these issues. While documentation of UN personnel engaging in acts of GBV/SEA is lacking, there is clear evidence that members of the HNP are committing these crimes. This makes a strong case both for better monitoring and

reporting as well as greater attention to the SEA/GBV issue as a whole. As mentioned before, both of these issues will be discussed more in Chapter 6.

One final note about the results of poverty combined with the lack of development projects. Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere and over half of the population lives on less than \$1/day.¹⁶⁴ With this extreme poverty, it is incredible that MINUSTAH has not done more to address development and economic needs. This again shows that peacekeeping operations need to better coordinate with economic agencies. Additionally, the poverty of local women feeds into the problem of SEA, with incentives to engage in prostitution in exchange for monetary or resource benefits.

¹⁶⁴ 12-1

5.0 UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT)

Timor-Leste's national history is an exceptional story of colonization and independence. As the first independent nation of the 21st century, East Timor is also a first for the UN in the realm of "nation building." Although there is no authoritative definition of this term, "nation building" differs from peacekeeping in that the United Nations is more integrally involved in the governance of the country during its transition from an unstable state (or in Timor-Leste's case a non-existent state) to stability and self-sufficiency. Just as in other missions, mainstreaming efforts are a part of the UN mission in Timor-Leste. However, because UN personnel have a thorough understanding of Timor-Leste's institutional structures, mainstreaming is extremely integrated between the mission and the government in many program areas.

*History*¹⁶⁵

The UN's involvement in Timor-Leste began in 1999 with a political operation whose mission was to determine whether the people of Timor-Leste would accept Indonesia's offer of special autonomy or whether they desired independence. After the country voted overwhelmingly for independence, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) ran the country's administration during the transition from October 1999 until Timor-Leste became fully independent in May 2002.

¹⁶⁵ Info in this section from 30 and 101

Post-independence, the UN remained involved in Timor-Leste with a three-year peacekeeping mission and a third year-long political mission. Although mandated to end in May of 2006, political, humanitarian, and security crises broke out early that year. The crises were a result of different experiences of the population during the years of occupation and independence, a single dominant party in the government, excessive executive power, and poverty. In response to the crises, the government of East Timor requested another peacekeeping mission. In August 2006, UNMIT was created by UN resolution 1704 (2006).

Because of the UN's deep understanding of the political, social, and economic issues in the country, the mandate of UNMIT was particularly detailed. The mission's tasks were similar to many of those in the preceding case studies: providing public security with UN police and support and training for the Timorese National Police (PNTL), building capacity in government institutions like the justice sector, monitoring, promoting, and protecting human rights (including for women), assisting with aid programs (focusing vulnerable groups like women and children), and assisting with the 2007 elections. Fortunately, the mention of vulnerable groups here is not dismissive as the mandate goes on to include an entire plank devoted to gender mainstreaming: "to mainstream gender perspectives and those of children and youth throughout the Mission's policies, programs and activities, and, working together with United Nations agencies, funds and programs, support the development of a national strategy to promote gender equality and empowerment of women."¹⁶⁶

Women in Timor-Leste

¹⁶⁶ 101-4

Prior to UNMIT, the situation of women varied depending on the governing power of the time. While under Indonesian authority, a 1999 journal indicated “[the women of East Timor] have been raped in the presence of family members, forced to marry Indonesian soldiers, subjected to torture by electric shock, sexually abused, and forcibly sterilized.”¹⁶⁷ East-Timorese women throughout their colonial history and persisting today are predominantly “illiterate, uneducated subsistence farmers.”¹⁶⁸ Regardless, women have been organizing since the beginning of dialogues and peace negotiations in the 1990s. Women worked with UN missions, such as when UNTAET was creating the government structure and women advocated for a gender section.¹⁶⁹ UNTAET also conducted many mainstreaming efforts with regard to elections and women’s leadership training.¹⁷⁰ After the 2001 elections, the new government accomplished many of the reforms women had lobbied for. The government created an Office for the Promotion of Equality in the office of the prime minister. To bring the country in line with international law, Timor-Leste signed and ratified CEDAW in 2003. Thus, by the time UNMIT began, women in Timor-Leste were familiar with the UN’s mainstreaming policy and already had some successes in policies and programs. However, progress by other missions does not negate the need for UNMIT to include mainstreaming efforts. Thus, below is an analysis of UNMIT on each of the seven criteria.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ 7-N/A

¹⁶⁸ 24-N/A

¹⁶⁹ 24-N/A

¹⁷⁰ 24-N/A

¹⁷¹ Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is not included because UNMIT’s mandate does not include such a component.

5.1 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Description

From the planning stages of UNMIT, the Secretary General discussed the need for a Senior Gender Advisor and a Conduct and Discipline Unit to deal with instances of SEA.¹⁷² A gender unit was created at the beginning of 2006 with Rita Reddy as the senior gender advisor. In addition to the gender unit, UNMIT has three other gender advisors in the Administration of Justice unit, the Serious Crime Investigation unit, and the HIV/AIDS Unit.¹⁷³ The integration of gender advisors into additional units demonstrates a very systematic approach to mainstreaming within UNMIT. As a result, gender perspectives in developing other programs are easily accessible and the gender advisors have expertise in both an individual program and gender issues. The implications of this cannot be understated.

As in other missions, a large part of the gender unit's work is training on gender sensitivity. Gender mainstreaming induction courses occur twice monthly and for all new staff.¹⁷⁴ These courses ensure that decision-makers take gender into account and that all programs and policies of UNMIT reflect gender sensitivity. In addition to training, the gender unit also works closely with local women's groups and members of Parliament on policy development.¹⁷⁵ The unit coordinated workshops and roundtables on issues such as gender-based violence for NGOs, the government, and other UN agencies. In 2007, a day-long

¹⁷² 100-34

¹⁷³ 56-10

¹⁷⁴ 56-9

¹⁷⁵ A description of these policies is in section 5.2.

workshop focused on the referral process for domestic violence and sexual assault. Participants discussed the origins of the GBV problem, the need for awareness, training, and capacity-building, increased access to services in the rural districts, and better coordination between the government and NGOs.¹⁷⁶ Another 10 day training educated legal and medical personnel who deal with victims of GBV.¹⁷⁷

Other external mainstreaming activities the gender unit has run include many programs in partnership with civil society groups advocating on gender issues. To celebrate International Women's Day 2008, UNMIT held events, such as films on domestic violence, community debates, sports, and cultural activities.¹⁷⁸ Near the end of 2007, the gender unit supported an annual "16 Days Campaign Against Violence" that consisted of workshops, seminars, TV debates, radio broadcasts, peaceful marches, music, and theatre and dance performances.¹⁷⁹ One partnering local group in this campaign was the Association of Men Against Violence, a network of prominent men in government, church, and community leadership positions which is working to redefine masculinity in Timorese culture. The group also has a peer mentoring and support program for group members to discuss violence against women. Some grassroots techniques used by the group include community education programs on public buses and at communal gatherings. The organization has partnered with the gender affairs unit to lobby the government on policy issues such as the draft law on domestic violence.¹⁸⁰

A final note is warranted on the source of much of the information in this section. Surprisingly, reports of the gender unit itself provide detailed accounts of the unit's activities.

¹⁷⁶ 57-12

¹⁷⁷ 57-9

¹⁷⁸ 58-4

¹⁷⁹ 56-6

¹⁸⁰ 56-6

Unlike some of the other missions that may have one or two irregular reports covering large time spans, UNMIT's gender affairs unit has produced extensive Quarterly Reports since 2007. These indicate that the operation is coordinated both internally and externally and has a vast network of supporting individuals and groups.

Evaluation

UNMIT's systematic approach to relationships and programs constitutes adequate efforts towards mainstreaming. The obvious commitment in number of gender advisors, organization of gender advisors, and programs for women demonstrates that this mission has a fully integrated policy of mainstreaming. The unit has many internal and external partners and has conducted important work to coordinate these groups' activities. Thus, UNMIT has made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming in this criterion.

5.2 POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Description

The majority of UNMIT's activities fall under this criterion because reconstruction is nearly synonymous with nation building. UNMIT has made mainstreaming efforts in the elections, the government, the justice system, and development programs. The 2007 elections were only Timor-Leste's second round of elections since independence. Ensuring that these elections were peaceful and incorporated women was part of UNMIT's mandate. To fulfill this mandate, UNMIT held a workshop series in April of 2006 aimed at preparing women for

elections.¹⁸¹ Voter education efforts targeted at women continued throughout 2006.¹⁸² In early 2007, UNMIT supported the appointment of members to the National Commission on Elections, of which one-third (5/15) are women.¹⁸³ In terms of elections policy, UNMIT lobbied for elections laws and party procedures that supported women's participation. Out of 16 parties, 12 signed a pact to participate in and advance a platform of women's issues. The platform included two affirmative action clauses: 1) there must be at least one woman in every group of four party members and 2) any substitution of a woman in a party role must be for another woman. Two parties went beyond these standards with one party headed by a woman and one of the eight parties with presidential candidates supporting a woman.

Elections were held in April and June of 2007 and turnout for women was significant; 47 to 48% of women voted; an excellent figure considering the total turnout of 80 to 82%.¹⁸⁴ One remarkable policy impacting turnout gave pregnant women and women with infants (along with the sick and elderly) priority in voting lines. This expedited women's voting time and prevented the inconveniences of voting from outweighing women's participation in the process. Some other reasons the gender affairs unit cited for high turnout amongst women were "voter education, civic education, and positive attitude of election management bodies."¹⁸⁵

The high turn-out among women was evident in the election results; 18 out of 246 women candidates were elected to the 65-member Parliament, bringing them to 28% of the body. While this is still not equal representation, it is a greater percentage than many developed nations

¹⁸¹ 99-3

¹⁸² 100-29

¹⁸³ 112-5

¹⁸⁴ 111-1

¹⁸⁵ 57-5

in 2007.¹⁸⁶ In the executive branch, women also hold significant positions. Three of ten ministers (Finance, Justice, and Solidarity) are women.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, women accounted for a quarter of all civil service jobs as of 2006.¹⁸⁸ Unfortunately, these roles are rarely leadership positions or areas which allow women to develop gender-sensitive policies within their departments. Instead, gender mainstreaming policies are siphoned into a few institutional havens for gender policy: 1) the Secretariat of State for the Promotion of Equality, an office under the Prime Minister, and 2) gender focal points in each government ministry. Four ministries (Education, Health, Justice, and Agriculture) are a part of a pilot program for additional gender mainstreaming support.¹⁸⁹ These institutional supports for mainstreaming are vestiges of mainstreaming policies created by previous UN missions and supported by UNMIT.

Following the elections, UNMIT remained involved in Parliament and civil society to ensure that newly-elected women are effective in their offices and that more women have opportunities to serve in the future. In Timor-Leste's districts, UNMIT held a series of dialogues for 727 individuals to connect women leaders to others in their community.¹⁹⁰ In another training session, community leaders learned the role of women in village councils and the role of these councils and village chiefs in preventing domestic violence.¹⁹¹ In 2008, UNMIT held a series of workshops on Timor-Leste's Constitution for representatives of women's organizations in village councils.¹⁹²

For women in Parliament, UNMIT assisted with a National Parliamentary Women's Caucus that met to define priorities on women's empowerment and equality and has begun to

¹⁸⁶ e.g. the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, etc.

¹⁸⁷ 57-2

¹⁸⁸ 100-29

¹⁸⁹ 57-1

¹⁹⁰ 111-12

¹⁹¹ 112-15

¹⁹² 117-15

develop a five-year plan on mainstreaming. Additionally, a gender resource center in Parliament substantively supports the women members to advance women's issues on the national agenda. One example of the role of this center is a training on gender-sensitive budgeting which was held for the women Parliament members.¹⁹³ UNMIT also supported sending three women members of Parliament to participate in the Asian-Pacific Women Parliamentarians and Ministers Conference.¹⁹⁴

Related to this work, UNMIT and the gender unit have advanced a few policy measures in Parliament and the national government. Specifically, they have worked on a gender equality act, revisions to the National Development Plan, and revisions to the penal code, including a draft domestic violence law. To support the domestic violence law, the gender unit convened workshops and roundtables with participants from local women's groups, international NGOs, the government, the legal system, relevant civil society groups, and other UN agencies. In addition to this law, UNMIT advocated for the Gender Land Law. This proposal would allow women to inherit property by creating joint titles between husbands and wives. UNMIT has convened a working group of government officials, UN officials, and NGO workers on the issue.¹⁹⁵ In the realm of development policy, UNMIT supported a dialogue and an extraordinary session of Parliament to discuss investments in women and girls that would promote equality and empowerment.

UNMIT's policy and training expertise was also applied in the justice sector. Timor-Leste's justice system had significant problems disproportionately affecting women seeking justice. A lack of courthouse security, including security assistance to witnesses or victims,

¹⁹³ 117-15

¹⁹⁴ 117-2

¹⁹⁵ 58-7, and 31-N/A

compromised women's ability to participate in the legal system.¹⁹⁶ Beyond security issues, the entire justice system lacked training and capacity to address gender issues. In response to these needs, UNMIT created a support system of gender officers. UNMIT provided trainings for all segments of the justice system from judges, prosecutors, and defenders, to community police, PNTL, the Crime Prevention Unit, and the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU). UNMIT trainings for PNTL on human rights, including gender issues, are ongoing.¹⁹⁷

The PNTL also had several successes including the creation of the VPU which receive resources donated by UNMIT.¹⁹⁸ This unit exists in all districts, is staffed by female police officers, and handles cases of gender-based violence. The national and district VPUs coordinate work support each other. A second success of the PNTL is the compilation and distribution of a gender sensitive police handbook for use by PNTL personnel.¹⁹⁹ PNTL also actively recruits women for the force. These numbers are reflected in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1: PNTL recruitment and certification

Date	Provisionally Certified			Fully Certified		
	Total	# Women	% Women	Total	# Women	% Women
Jul 2008	3114	570	18%	599	126	21%
Jan 2008	1503	271	18%	186	42	22.5%
Aug 2007	981	168	17%			

Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General

Although parity has not been reached, the force is growing. At the very least, the women who are in the force have specific roles in the VPUs.

In the area of development assistance, UNMIT helped to steer \$5.9 million in international aid from the Millennium Development Goals to Timor-Leste over three years. This

¹⁹⁶ 100-23

¹⁹⁷ 58-5

¹⁹⁸ 56-6

¹⁹⁹ 58-1

money is specifically targeted for projects involving gender equality and women's human rights programs. However, UNMIT has not funded QIPS or development projects.

Evaluation

UNMIT has made adequate efforts on this criterion. Supporting women in leadership and government both before and after the elections was a major achievement. The elections policy proposals for women's equality within political parties were a significant accomplishment. UNMIT also worked to influence policy on GBV and women's equality. For the police and justice system, UNMIT has provided extensive trainings and is working to support women's needs in the justice system.

5.3 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Description

This criterion unfortunately is again a part of the mission's activities. The first study on GBV in Timor-Leste in 2002 indicated that "almost half the respondents reported at least one incident of "violence" from their partners in the previous year."²⁰⁰ When UNMIT began in August of 2006, GBV was the most frequently reported crime nationwide. In August of 2007, reports of GBV temporarily decreased, but rose again in early 2008 [see Figure 5-2].

²⁰⁰ 124-1

Figure 5-2: Reports of Rape and Domestic Violence, by date

Date	Rape Reports	Domestic Violence Reports	GBV Cases
February 2008			46
January 2008			41
Jan.-Dec. 2007	26	207	
February 2007			11
January 2007			11

Note: All figures from UNMIT Gender Affairs Quarterly Reports

UNMIT justifies the increase as follows:

This could be explained by a number of factors including an increased confidence in the police resulting in more reporting than last year, and a change in the classification of gender based violence cases by UNPOL in 2008. UNPOL have renamed rape offences as sexual offences, and instead of domestic violence, they have created two new categories of assault/domestic and dispute/domestic to provide a better understanding of the nature of cases and to better document the different complaints. Using different classifications this year means that it is possible many domestic disputes in 2007 were not documented as domestic violence or gender based violence accounts.²⁰¹

In addition to the absolute number of GBV incidents, the problem is compounded by a backlog of cases and the inability of the justice system to handle cases in a time-efficient manner. As of July 2008, one-third of the 4,700 backlogged criminal cases involved GBV.²⁰² Because of this delay, many women resolve their cases through traditional justice mechanisms. These mechanisms are used due to the lack of a domestic violence law and a perception that the VPUs lack capacity to deal with these cases. However, the traditional justice systems are devoid of a legal basis and the cases they hear are rarely brought to the attention of police, preventing a true understanding of the problems of GBV.²⁰³

UNMIT has provided many resources to address GBV. The gender affairs unit is working to develop a draft law on domestic violence and lobby for its approval, as mentioned in

²⁰¹ 58-6

²⁰² 119-10

²⁰³ 56-20

section 5.2. UNMIT helped the Ministry of Labor and Community Relations and the Ministry of Health to develop responses to GBV. Two districts are piloting accelerated GBV response activities.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, UNMIT provided 15 trained peer educators on GBV, eight of whom are women.²⁰⁵ UNMIT is also translating a training manual on domestic violence and developing a medical protocol for victims of domestic violence or sexual abuse.²⁰⁶ Finally, UNMIT held a train the trainer pilot program for GBV investigations which effectively addressed concepts about which previous working groups had revealed confusion.²⁰⁷

One initiative which began locally but is now supported by UNMIT is a referral program for victims of GBV. Although the program's main efforts are currently concentrated in Dili, UNMIT is working to expand the program into the districts by strengthening relationships with NGOs, organizing awareness-raising, and conducting a baseline study on GBV in two of the boarder districts.²⁰⁸ UNMIT has also held a series of ten trainings for 249 participants in civil society on different aspects of the referral network. A separate training was held for individuals who are part of the legal or medical aspects of the referral network to help them develop their skills and better coordinate with each other.²⁰⁹ These trainees can now address the lack of trials and prosecutions for cases that go through the referral program. UNMIT also works to disseminate legal information about GBV during public meetings on justice issues.

²⁰⁴ 58-5

²⁰⁵ 117-11

²⁰⁶ 57-9 and 58-5

²⁰⁷ 58-6

²⁰⁸ 57-13

²⁰⁹ 57-9

Evaluation

With these numerous efforts, UNMIT has again made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming. By reporting on statistics and tracking cases of GBV, UNMIT demonstrates its awareness of this issue. Lobbying for legal changes to domestic violence law is an important next step on this issue. Additionally trainings and provisions of expertise to the justice system is an effective way to support addressing these issues. Finally, the victim referral network is an innovative strategy to deal with the entirety of the GBV issue.

5.4 GENDER BALANCE IN RECRUITMENT

Unfortunately, in terms of gender balance, UNMIT is no different than any other peacekeeping operation. As shown in Figure 5-3, women make up just over a third of international staff, but the percentages of military and police officers are dismal. Appendix D displays the military personnel data going back to August of 2006. These numbers also show a fluctuation between zero and two women personnel, resulting in higher percentage fluctuations than other missions, because of the low number of total military personnel.

Figure 5-3: Gender Balance in UNMIT personnel

Military Personnel, by date	Total Number	# of Women	% Women
July 2008	33	0	0%
January 2008	33	0	0%
August 2007	34	1	3%
February 2007	33	1	3%
Police Officers, by date			
July 2008	1542	76	5%
January 2008	1480	77	5%
August 2007	1635	94	6%
February 2007	1313	79	6%
Civilian Staff, by date			
July 2008	1165	264	23%
January 2008	1147	258	22.5%
August 2007	1145	253	22%
February 2007	538	116	21.5%

Note: All figures from Reports of the Secretary General

UNMIT has expressed a need for more UNMIT officers with training and experience in gender-based crimes and a need to train all UNMIT police as well as PNTL in women's needs, investigative techniques, and women's access to judicial recourse. These needs have not been met nor supplemented by additional recruitment of female personnel. Furthermore, there are no women in the mission's top leadership. Fortunately, the four gender advisors that UNMIT has are working successfully, as demonstrated above, to mainstream gender perspectives despite the gender imbalance in staff.

Evaluation

Regardless of gender advisors or other mainstreaming successes, on this criterion UNMIT has made no efforts to achieve gender balance. While this failure has not yet caused havoc in other areas, it is a troubling blemish on UNMIT's overall record. The lack of women in leadership is particularly troubling. While their role is supplanted by gender advisors, there is still a need for additional women in all aspects of this mission.

5.5 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE BY UN PERSONNEL

Description

Examining UNMIT's efforts in this criterion is a challenge. On one hand, GBV by UN personnel is not an endemic problem in this mission the way it has been in the other cases analyzed in this paper. Certainly this is a positive fact. At the same time, the strikingly low numbers have also prevented UNMIT from making any true efforts in this criterion. Unfortunately, the only two data points available on this criterion overlap are too dissimilar to allow any inference of trends over time. Between August 2006 and February 2007, 10 rape cases and 2 sexual assault of minors cases were reported.²¹⁰ Between January and August 2007, only 8 allegations of SEA were reported.²¹¹ Furthermore, the fact that data is not reported more frequently is worrisome; it prevents due diligence on the issue. Even more frightening is the knowledge that other missions have existed with problems of GBV by peacekeepers for a short period under the radar before exploding publically and tarnishing the UN's reputation. The only efforts UNMIT does state it has taken are a blanket commitment to the zero-tolerance policy and training. All new staff members listen to presentations on gender awareness and mainstreaming and SEA training by the Conduct and Discipline Unit as part of their induction training.

Evaluation

While without more data, it is difficult to assess UNMIT on this criterion, their efforts are considerably inadequate. This very lack of data is the main cause of the inadequate score here.

²¹⁰ 112-10

²¹¹ 111-10

In other missions, it is clear that the zero-tolerance policy and training have not deterred issues of SEA. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these measures are effective to prevent issues in Timor-Leste. However, a more proactive policy would be required for adequate efforts on this criterion.

5.6 MONITORING AND REPORTING

Description

Although the Reports of the Secretary General do not have a separate “gender” section, gender issues are integrated throughout the reports in more relevant sections. Furthermore, UNMIT is the only mission to have quarterly reports of the Gender Affairs division, opening the books into the daily operations of the senior gender advisor. These reports are extensive and demonstrate the coordination of the Gender Advisor with other segments of UNMIT and other UN agencies. While the differences in reporting techniques between UNMIT and the other missions may seem minor, they are in fact quite significant for the mission’s perspective of itself and for the progress of UN missions in the future.

The only issue with UNMIT’s reporting is a lack of better conduct and discipline reporting. It is unclear how many incidents have taken place, particularly in the area of SEA. Without these numbers, UNMIT does lack some credibility and potentially an awareness of SEA problems.

Evaluation

Despite one failure on this criterion, UNMIT had made adequate efforts towards mainstreaming. The integrated reporting and detailed gender unit reports are superior to other methods. The integrated reports allow other peacekeeping officials looking for methods or best practices in various programs to be confronted by mainstreaming tasks. The gender unit reports hold that unit accountable and demonstrate the importance of such a unit in UN missions. Thus, UNMIT clearly deserves the adequate marks on this criterion.

5.7 SUMMARY

Peacekeeping Operation	Adequate
Post-Conflict Reconstruction	Adequate
DDR	N/A
Preventing and Responding to GBV	Adequate
Gender Balance	None
Preventing and Responding to GBV by UN personnel	Inadequate
Monitoring and Reporting	Adequate

UNMIT made adequate efforts on a majority of the mainstreaming criteria and is thus a highly exceptional case. The country's unique history and the UN's program of nation-building had a strong influence on UNMIT's gender mainstreaming efforts.²¹² Therefore, UNMIT's efforts in isolation are questionable because the mission is merely building upon the success of UNTAET and other previous UN missions in the country. UNTAET is unique, however, because the mission allowed the UN to create an entire government structure and related

²¹² For a history of how gender was mainstreamed in UNTAET, prior to UNMIT, see 127

institutions in the country. One of the features UNTAET built into the government was a gender unit. Sherrill Whittington, a member of UNTAET's gender affairs unit, comments on the value of this: "national governments are being established, and the creation of a sustainable Gender Affairs office has the potential to become the national machinery for women."²¹³ Additionally, UNTAET ensured the new government's conformity to international human rights standards and agreements like CEDAW. Clearly, when the UN virtually controls a nation's governance and policies, and the leadership is committed to mainstreaming, success is imminent.

Another anomalous, and potentially related, characteristic of UNMIT is that it is the only case in this paper which effectively reported gender data. This was certainly influenced by UNMIT's ability to commit staff to this task based on the stable security situation and the government foundations built by previous missions. Additionally, the increased number of gender advisors integrated into the mission certainly played a role in tabulating and reporting gender data. Thus, successful reporting reinforces the need for a robust, fully staffed gender unit with supporting gender advisors in other units.

Considering UNMIT's success in so many of the criteria, the mission's lack of gender balance is ironic. This case demonstrates that while gender balance is sufficient for a mission to claim mainstreaming success, it is not a necessary condition. This seems counterintuitive given the beneficial role that gender balance can have in planning in criteria such as post-conflict reconstruction, DDR, and preventing and responding to gender based violence. In UNMIT, other factors, both in UNMIT and prior missions, have clearly assumed the roles that increases in the presence of women play in other missions. Supportive leadership and multiple gender advisors are some of the possible factors.

²¹³ 127-80

Finally, the two areas in which UNMIT did not make adequate efforts are both criteria in which the other missions examined in this paper struggled with, as well. The following chapter will comment on these system-wide peacekeeping issues.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

In the summaries of the previous four chapters, nation-building, poverty, and basic peace and security have all affected the ability of peacekeeping missions to mainstream effectively. While the results of these unique situations have been addressed in prior sections, there are also trends across several of the case studies that have not been addressed. Most significantly, there are three criteria in which three or more of the missions had inadequate or no efforts: gender balance, gender-based violence by UN personnel, and monitoring and reporting. Upon closer examination, these poor scores appear to be the result of more than just failures of individual missions; there are broader policies of the DPKO and the UN which have caused these failures.

Gender Balance

None of the four cases in this paper have adequately achieved gender balance, and most do not maintain their own statistics on gender balance. As mentioned before, the DPKO began substituting for some of this data collection in August of 2006. Appendix E reflects the gender balance of military personnel in all UN peacekeeping missions, as recorded by the DPKO. The percent of women hangs at approximately two percent, with rises and dips, but no consistent pattern of improvement over the last two and a half years. Furthermore, even after crediting the DPKO for maintaining these statistics, consistent data on civilian police and civilian personnel is

still lacking. Neither individual missions nor the DPKO have been able to maintain these records.

Beyond the lack of data, the existing data indicate a problem in that there is no parity in any division of UN personnel. The main reason for this problem is that gender balance is influenced by the voluntary contributions of member nations. Member nations set their own eligibility policies for their national armies which frequently exclude women from some or all areas of service. Thus, many troop-contributing nations simply do not have military women to provide to peacekeeping missions. In response to the lack of gender balance, the DPKO began efforts to promote the recruitment of women. The Secretary General's 2004 Women, Peace and Security report discusses the challenge of recruiting qualified women.²¹⁴ The report also indicates one effort in which the DPKO "introduced specific language into vacancy announcements, targeting professional women's organizations"²¹⁵ However, subsequent reports on Women, Peace, and Security rarely mention gender balance or only discuss the issue in terms of women's representation in leadership positions. This demonstrates the need to consistently relay the problem of a widespread lack of women in military, police, and civilian components of peacekeeping missions.

Other efforts to promote gender balance have included workshops and reports on the issue. In March of 2006, the UN held a policy dialogue to review strategies for enhancing gender balance among uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions. The dialogue developed recommendations for both member nations and the DPKO. For example, the DPKO was instructed to specify a minimum number or percent of women required for deployment, and member nations were asked to maintain a list of women with relevant peacekeeping skills for

²¹⁴ 86-19

²¹⁵ 86-19

short-term deployment and to work with the DPKO to revise their recruitment practices.²¹⁶ A 2007 Strategy Workshop on the Implementation of Resolution 1325 made similar recommendations for member nations to develop national policies on the deployment of women in peacekeeping operations and to integrate gender into defense departments or military leadership positions. The workshop recommended removing policies like biometric requirements (physical and strength tests) that discriminate against women's participation in military units, and increasing public information campaigns promoting women in peacekeeping.²¹⁷

Unfortunately the most that any workshop, strategy session, or request of the Secretary General can do is recommend, advise, or request. Thus, the United Nations should consider a policy of positive incentives for member nations that achieve set benchmarks toward full equality of men and women in military, police, and civilian contributions. Incentives could be either monetary (compensation for female units would be higher) or political (that country's nationals are favored in appointments). Such policies would have positive effects in achieving gender balance in UN peacekeeping, but would also promote progressive policies in nations which currently exclude women in national militaries or police forces.

Sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence by UN personnel

Closely related to the gender balance problem is the issue of gender-based violence by UN peacekeepers. This relation is described by Sarah Martin in a 2005 report of Refugees International as: "since the bulk of personnel in peacekeeping missions are men, a hyper-masculine culture that encourages sexual exploitation and abuse and a tradition of silence have

²¹⁶ 34-4

²¹⁷ 35-5

evolved within them.”²¹⁸ Although the 2008 Women, Peace, and Security Report observes an overall decline in instances of SEA by UN personnel (“from 371 reported in 2006 to 159 cases reported in 2007”²¹⁹), this is 159 more incidents than a zero-tolerance policy should allow for.

As described in the four cases above, the only UN policy that is consistent in all cases is training and “enforcement” of the zero-tolerance policy. Some personnel may receive some of the information during pre-deployment training by their home country or from regional peacekeeping institutes. Theoretically, all personnel receive this training during induction in their mission country. However, simply providing conduct and discipline information once is clearly not enough to prevent these crimes from occurring:

While this training covers the issues of sexual exploitation and the UN’s approach to gender, it’s unclear whether or not it is effective. This training covers everything from the codes of conduct to human resources issues. According to one UNMIL employee, “It’s too intensive. You get bombarded with information and it happens right after you’ve been traveling. It’s hard to remember anything that came out of it.”²²⁰

In addition to the poor timing and overwhelming nature of induction training, other barriers may prevent the absorption of information as well. For example, as was described specifically in MONUC’s training programs, it is common that military and police personnel do not all speak the mission language. Thus, training information is lost or commanders ineffectively translate information, resulting in misunderstandings of gender and conduct information.

Another issue may be differences in cultures. Martin explains, “each contributing country has its own culture and mores, its own attitudes toward alcohol, women, sex and its own thoughts about what constitutes ‘proper behavior.’”²²¹ She goes on to provide an example of

²¹⁸ 18-ii

²¹⁹ 122-16

²²⁰ 18-20

²²¹ 18-19

Pakistani soldiers who were shocked by Sierra Leonean women who worked bare-breasted. These cultural differences require sensitivity training along with the understanding that GBV and SEA are unacceptable despite cultural differences in sex and gender.

A final significant aspect of the problem is the inability of the UN and local victims to follow-up with disciplinary measures. Peacekeeping troops report to their home country commanders and these countries retain control over conduct and discipline issues. Thus, observes Martin, “if a soldier is found guilty, that person is sent back to his country for discipline. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for victims and their families to determine what, if any, actions have been taken.”²²² Until recently, the UN merely repatriated soldiers found guilty of SEA or other conduct issues and forwarded the investigation report to their home nation. There is now a greater move to follow-up with disciplinary actions. However, member nations have an ambiguous legal obligation to take action against their own citizens’ criminal acts. Thus, especially as fellow soldiers see that few if any consequences exist for these acts, a culture of impunity is established.

Because it is clear that there are shortfalls in many of the current efforts to prevent SEA issues, likely no one solution will be enough. However, in addition to increasing gender balance (as described above), the next step needs to change the current training program. Member nations must take greater responsibility for training their troops in international human rights norms. Developing military and police units that are professionals in international peacekeeping would be an ideal solution. The current deployment of units for only a few months promotes a temporary view of peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers’ actions do not have consequences. Instead, developing professionals who receive training on SEA (and other gender

²²² 18-iv

sensitivity, human rights, and best practices) over a period of months and years will help peacekeepers to become vested in missions.

Unfortunately, this solution is not realistic for the all personnel in peacekeeping missions (or would take decades to implement if it was to become practical). Thus, in the short term, the UN must work on deterrence and demonstrating the clear consequences of SEA to its personnel. When troops are repatriated for punishment, individual missions need to follow-up with the disciplinary action taken and relay that information back to the rest of the force. Furthermore, follow-up trainings for all mission personnel need to emphasize both disciplinary consequences to the individual and security and perception consequences for the mission.

Monitoring and Reporting

The third and final system-wide failure of the DPKO in mainstreaming is a lack of monitoring and reporting. The 2004 Women Peace and Security Report indicated that in the first six months of 2004, 23.5% of UN reports contained multiple references to gender.²²³ A main reason for the lack of gender reporting, and the lack of detailed programmatic reporting, is limited staff and limited time. However, statistical information – such as gender disaggregated data on DDR participants, gender balance, or incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse – should not require an overwhelming number of resources. In these situations, the Security Council should set and enforce a standard for gender reporting. A suggestion from the Windhoek Declaration to avoid the resource trade-off was to have an external end of mission report that includes a gender perspective.²²⁴ In addition to ongoing gender reporting, this could be a valuable asset to UN mainstreaming operations. While the missions examined in this paper are

²²³ 86-23

²²⁴ 69-4

all still in operation, this recommendation could promote the missions' successes and apply them to future operations.

A different sort of recommendation to address reporting is to have the current external agency in charge of monitoring and reporting, the DPKO Best Practices Section, change its style of reporting. The Section's current reports are long, their subjects are ad hoc, and the topics may or may not include gender. However, this section has the resources to write much shorter reports on individual successful programs in one mission. Such reports, indexed by mission area or program type, would truly share accomplishments among missions and allow for mission leaders to easily access information about mainstreaming in particular areas.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the UN must improve its record on these three criteria in all peacekeeping missions. Additionally, the issues of poverty, basic peace and security, and nation-building as described in previous summaries, must be taken into consideration as well. While these are significant challenges, the UN has the ability to take action and improve as it has been improving over the past few decades. While there is no silver bullet, many small reforms in the past have been successful and the recommendations of this paper may continue to create progress throughout the DPKO and for all people in post-conflict nations.

APPENDIX A: ACRONYM INDEX

AIDS – Acquired Immunodeficiency Disorder Syndrome
CDC – Community Development Committee (Haiti)
CAFF – Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CARICOM – Caribbean Community
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CIVPOL – Civilian Police (of the United Nations)
CVPD – Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development (Haiti)
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS – Economic Coalition of West African States
FARDC – Congolese National Army (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*)
FGM – Female Genital Mutilation
GBV – Gender-Based Violence
HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HNP – Haitian National Police
LNP – Liberian National Police
MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (*Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti*)
MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NEC – National Electoral Commission (Liberia)
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OAS – Organization of American States


OGA – Office of Gender Affairs
PKO – Peacekeeping Operation
PNC – Congolese National Police
PNTL – National Police of Timor-Leste (*Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste*)
QIP – Quick Impact Project
ROC – Reinsertion Orientation Centers (Haiti)
SEA – Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR – United Nations Instituted for Training and Research
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIT – United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
VPU – Vulnerable Persons Unit (Timor-Leste)
WAFF – Women Associated with Fighting Forces
WHO – World Health Organization

APPENDIX B: UNMIL GENDER BALANCE

B.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN

	Total	# women	% women
Jan. 2009	10762	254	2.36%
Dec. 2008	10787	256	2.37%
Nov. 2008	10982	258	2.35%
Oct. 2008	11646	258	2.22%
Sept. 2008	11645	259	2.22%
Aug. 2008	11642	262	2.25%
Jul. 2008	11729	240	2.05%
Jun. 2008	11788	236	2.00%
May. 2008	11789	236	2.00%
Apr. 2008	12235	236	1.93%
Mar. 2008	12438	235	1.89%
Feb. 2008	12948	224	1.73%
Jan. 2008	13485	213	1.58%
Dec. 2007	13509	208	1.54%
Nov. 2007	13534	207	1.53%
Oct. 2007	13528	206	1.52%
Sept. 2007	14125	286	2.02%
Aug. 2007	14127	290	2.05%
Jul. 2007	14135	263	1.86%
Jun. 2007	14151	273	1.93%
May. 2007	14138	270	1.91%
Apr. 2007	14060	294	2.09%
Mar. 2007	14055	314	2.23%
Feb. 2007	14056	318	2.26%
Jan. 2007	14003	318	2.27%
Dec. 2006	13801	150	1.09%
Nov. 2006	14541	330	2.27%
Oct. 2006	14641	337	2.30%
Sept. 2006	14770	344	2.33%
Aug. 2006	14807	345	2.33%

B.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN




APPENDIX C: MONUC GENDER BALANCE

C.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN

	Total	# women	% women
Jan. 2009	17319	268	1.55%
Dec. 2008	17343	268	1.55%
Nov. 2008	17305	268	1.55%
Oct. 2008	17425	270	1.55%
Sept. 2008	17342	228	1.31%
Aug. 2008	17338	229	1.32%
Jul. 2008	17346	233	1.34%
Jun. 2008	17359	295	1.70%
May. 2008	17365	300	1.73%
Apr. 2008	17383	300	1.73%
Mar. 2008	17359	321	1.85%
Feb. 2008	17355	323	1.86%
Jan. 2008	17349	326	1.88%
Dec. 2007	17347	333	1.92%
Nov. 2007	17396	377	2.17%
Oct. 2007	17388	376	2.16%
Sept. 2007	17361	374	2.15%
Aug. 2007	17284	362	2.09%
Jul. 2007	17363	309	1.78%
Jun. 2007	17348	309	1.78%
May. 2007	17321	308	1.78%
Apr. 2007	17318	301	1.74%
Mar. 2007	17307	301	1.74%
Feb. 2007	17342	301	1.74%
Jan. 2007	17332	304	1.75%
Dec. 2006	17221	216	1.25%
Nov. 2006	17398	305	1.75%
Oct. 2006	17397	336	1.93%
Sept. 2006	17390	337	1.94%
Aug. 2006	17415	342	1.96%

C.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN




APPENDIX D: MINUSTAH GENDER BALANCE

D.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN

	Total	# women	% women
Jan. 2009	7037	124	1.76%
Dec. 2008	7036	127	1.81%
Nov. 2008	7013	126	1.80%
Oct. 2008	7009	120	1.71%
Sept. 2008	7018	120	1.71%
Aug. 2008	7027	122	1.74%
Jul. 2008	7105	124	1.75%
Jun. 2008	7070	125	1.77%
May. 2008	7174	125	1.74%
Apr. 2008	7082	125	1.77%
Mar. 2008	7064	124	1.76%
Feb. 2008	7060	130	1.84%
Jan. 2008	7066	132	1.87%
Dec. 2007	7047	126	1.79%
Nov. 2007	7062	134	1.90%
Oct. 2007	7060	125	1.77%
Sept. 2007	7062	125	1.77%
Aug. 2007	7054	129	1.83%
Jul. 2007	7081	134	1.89%
Jun. 2007	7065	125	1.77%
May. 2007	7050	120	1.70%
Apr. 2007	7036	117	1.66%
Mar. 2007	7023	116	1.65%
Feb. 2007	6799	110	1.62%
Jan. 2007	6782	104	1.53%
Dec. 2006	6684	96	1.44%
Nov. 2006	6668	95	1.42%
Oct. 2006	6652	94	1.41%
Sept. 2006	6642	92	1.39%
Aug. 2006	6430	87	1.35%

D.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN




APPENDIX E: UNMIT GENDER BALANCE

E.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN

UNMIT			
	Total	# women	% women
Jan. 2009	33	2	6.06%
Dec. 2008	33	1	3.03%
Nov. 2008	32	1	3.13%
Oct. 2008	32	0	0%
Sept. 2008	33	0	0%
Aug. 2008	33	0	0%
Jul. 2008	33	0	0%
Jun. 2008	31	0	0%
May. 2008	31	0	0%
Apr. 2008	31	0	0%
Mar. 2008	33	0	0%
Feb. 2008	32	0	0%
Jan. 2008	32	0	0%
Dec. 2007	33	0	0%
Nov. 2007	33	0	0%
Oct. 2007	32	1	3.13%
Sept. 2007	37	1	2.70%
Aug. 2007	32	1	3.13%
Jul. 2007	33	1	3.03%
Jun. 2007	33	1	3.03%
May. 2007	33	2	6.06%
Apr. 2007	33	1	3.03%
Mar. 2007	33	1	3.03%
Feb. 2007	33	1	3.03%
Jan. 2007	32	1	3.13%
Dec. 2006	32	1	3.13%
Nov. 2006	32	1	3.13%
Oct. 2006	31	1	3.23%
Sept. 2006	18	1	5.56%
Aug. 2006	15	1	6.67%

E.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN




APPENDIX F: ALL UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS GENDER BALANCE

F.1 2006-2009 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF WOMEN

All Missions			
	Total	# women	% women
Jan. 2009	80597	1743	2.16%
Dec. 2008	80201	1794	2.24%
Nov. 2008	78170	1789	2.29%
Oct. 2008	78124	1789	2.29%
Sept. 2008	77231	1626	2.11%
Aug. 2008	77057	1734	2.25%
Jul. 2008	77117	1640	2.13%
Jun. 2008	76934	1671	2.17%
May. 2008	77050	1651	2.14%
Apr. 2008	77388	1651	2.13%
Mar. 2008	77492	1539	1.99%
Feb. 2008	79269	1534	1.94%
Jan. 2008	79629	1476	1.85%
Dec. 2007	73232	1360	1.86%
Nov. 2007	73348	1408	1.92%
Oct. 2007	73287	1406	1.92%
Sept. 2007	73908	1476	2.00%
Aug. 2007	73948	1486	2.00%
Jul. 2007	74181	1411	1.90%
Jun. 2007	73918	1411	1.91%
May. 2007	73771	1414	1.92%
Apr. 2007	73706	1417	1.92%
Mar. 2007	73475	1416	1.93%
Feb. 2007	73307	1305	1.78%
Jan. 2007	72784	1299	1.78%
Dec. 2006	71673	1034	1.44%
Nov. 2006	73638	1199	1.63%
Oct. 2006	72488	1234	1.70%
Sept. 2006	69055	1235	1.79%
Aug. 2006	66790	1235	1.85%

F.2 CHANGE IN PERCENT OF WOMEN



WORKS CITED

1. Almog, Nava, and Nadine Puechguirbal. (n.d.) *A City in the Sand*. Retrieved January 2009 from http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/Haiti_gender_book_ENG.pdf.
2. Amnesty International. (2006). *Amnesty International Report 2006 (Haiti)* [Electronic version]. Retrieved January 2009 from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,AMNESTY,,HTI,,447ff7aa11,0.html>
3. Amnesty International. (2008). *Don't Turn Your Back: Sexual Violence Against Girls in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (AMR 36/004/2008). London: Amnesty International.
4. Bakody, Jennifer. (2005, December 2). *Labour and delivery facilities opened at Bunagana (North-Kivu)*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=9242>
5. BBC News. (2007, November 3). *Sri Lanka to probe UN sex claims*. Retrieved February 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7076284.stm
6. BBC News. (n.d.) *Timeline: Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved December 2008 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm
7. Eaton, Tim. (1999, August 26). *Raping the Future, Mother Jones*. Retrieved January 2009 from http://www.motherjones.com/news/special_reports/east_timor/features/women.html
8. Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean. (2005). *Rewinding History: The Rights of Haitian Women*. Retrieved January 2009 from <http://www.epica.org/haiti/rewinding-history.htm>.
9. Erturk, Yakin. (2007, July 27). *South Kivu: 4,500 sexual violence cases in the first six months of this year alone*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=15065>.
10. European Union. Election Observation Mission to Liberia. (2005, October 13). *Statement Of Preliminary Findings And Conclusions* [Electronic version]. Monrovia, Liberia. Retrieved October 2008 from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/liberia/prelim_final.pdf

11. Haiti - MINUSTAH – Background. (2005). Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/minustah/background.html>
12. *Haiti Poverty Profile*. (2006). Retrieved December 2008 from www.haitianconnection.org/haitiPovertyProfile.doc
13. Gender Statistics. (2008). Retrieved February 2009 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/gend.html>
14. Herwig, Christopher. (2007). *UNMIL: International Engagement in Addressing Violence against Women* [Electronic version]. ActionAid Liberia.
15. Koumbo, Sy. (2008, April 1). *One day workshop held on the promotion of new sexual violence law in the DRC*. Retrieved October 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=17003>
16. Lewis, Stephen. (2008, May 27). *Women targeted or affected by armed conflict: What role for military peacekeepers?* [Electronic version]. Retrieved January 2008 from http://216.95.229.16/news_item.cfm?news=2400
17. Liberia – UNMIL – Background. (2005). Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/background.html>
18. Martin, Sarah. (2005, October). *Must Boys be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation & Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions* [Electronic version]. Refugees International. Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/MustBoysbeBoys.pdf>
19. Martin, Sarah and Gantz, Peter. (2005, March 7). *Haiti: Sexual Exploitation by Peacekeepers Likely to be a Problem* [Electronic version]. Washington DC: Refugees International. Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,RI,,HTI,,47a6eeb40,0.html>
20. Nairobi Declaration. (2002). Retrieved October 2008 from http://www.fasngo.org/assets/files/frontline_actions/nairobi.pdf
21. Paglialonga, Piergiorgio. (2007, May 24). *Official Handover of Maghagi Prison to local authorities*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=14647>
22. Puechguirbal, Nadine. (2003). *Women and War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4). Retrieved September 2008 from JSTOR database.

23. Schroeder, Emily. (2004). A Window of Opportunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Incorporating a Gender Perspective in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Process, *Peace, Conflict, and Development*, 5. Retrieved October 2008, from <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/AWindowofOpportunity.PDF>
24. Scott, Catherine. (2003, June 30). Are women included or excluded in Post-Conflict Reconstruction?: A Case study from East Timor. *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Timor-Leste/CIIRWomensPart03.html>
25. Shteir, Sarah. (2004, October). An Interview with Nadine Puechguirbal, Senior Gender Advisor, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/NPuechguirbalinterview04.pdf>
26. Singh, Anita Inder. (2007). Security and Development: Challenges for Donors. *UN Chronicle Online Edition*. Retrieved February 2009 from http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/062907_challenges_for_donors.htm
27. Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson. (2006). *Liberia's Gender Based Violence National Action Plan* [Electronic version]. Retrieved August 2008 from www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/21.pdf
28. Smythe, Amy. (2003, October 29). *UN Security Council Presentation on UNSC Resolution 1325*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/SCOpenDebate2003/Smythe2003.html>
29. Stewart, Frances. (n.d.). Development and Security [Electronic version]. Oxford: Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity. Retrieved February 2008 from <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper3.pdf>
30. *Timor-Leste - UNMIT - Background*. (2006). Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/background.html>
31. United Nations. (2008, July 28). *Workshop aims to strengthen women's rights to land, property*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=228&ctl=Details&mid=456&Itemid=286>
32. United Nations. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. (2008, March). *Combined initial, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh periodic reports of States parties: Haiti*. (CEDAW/C/HTI/7). Port-au-Prince: Haiti.
33. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2000). *Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action* [Electronic version]. Windhoek, Namibia: United Nations.

34. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2006). *Policy Dialogue To Review Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance among uniformed Personnel in Peacekeeping Missions* [Electronic version]. New York: United Nations. Retrieved February 2008 from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/Final%20Report%20TCC%20PCC%20Policy%20Dialogue%20_English_.pdf
35. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2007). *Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women Peace and Security in Peacekeeping Contexts* [Electronic version]. Pretoria, South Africa: United Nations. Retrieved February 2008 from http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/PDF/Pretoria_concl.pdf
36. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MINUSTAH. (2005, July 19). *Mobilization of Haitian Women for the Elections* [Electronic version]. (Press Release 152). Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/pr152e.pdf>
37. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MINUSTAH. (2005, October 31). *La MINUSTAH soutient la participation des femmes au processus démocratique en Haïti* [Electronic version]. (Press Release 191). Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=2788>.
38. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MINUSTAH. (2005, March 7). *Conférence-débat sur le rôle des femmes de la MINUSTAH dans le processus de paix en Haïti* [Electronic version]. (Press Release 93). Retrieved November 2008 from http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/minustah/pr93.pdf.
39. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MINUSTAH. (2005, February 28). *Elections in Haiti: the Special Representative meets with women from political parties* [Electronic version]. (Press Release 88). Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/pr88e.pdf>.
40. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MINUSTAH. (n.d.). *Atelier sur le Renforcement du Rôle des Femmes dans les Processus Electoraux Post-conflit/crise: les pratiques optimales et leçons apprises*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://www.minustah.org/pages/Atelier-sur-le-Renforcement-du-R%F4le-des-Femmes-dans-les-Processus-Electoraux>
41. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. MONUC. (2003). *Activities Report from the Office of Gender Affairs of MONUC* [Electronic version]. Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo.
42. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2005, August 12). *Thirty women electoral candidates benefit from campaign training*. (Press Release 194). Retrieved July 2008, from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=501>.

43. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2008, June 15). *New Confidence in Liberian Police Has More Women and Children Reporting Crime*. (Press Release 57). Retrieved July 2008, from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=2788>.
44. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, December 2). *Full participation of women in society is crucial to development, says UN Envoy*. (Press Release 148). Retrieved July 2008, from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=2559>.
45. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, April 27). *UN Envoy stresses importance of women's participation in society; emphasizes need for secure environment for investment*. (Press Release 46). Retrieved July 2008, from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=2173>.
46. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, November 29). *Liberian Government and United Nations launch nationwide anti-rape campaign*. (Press Release 147). Retrieved July 2008, from <http://www.unmil.org/article.asp?id=2558>.
47. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. Office of Gender Affairs. (2006). *Outcomes Of Gender Mainstreaming By The Office Of The Gender Adviser: UNMIL: 2004-2006* [Electronic version]. Retrieved August 2008 from http://unmil.org/documents/OGA_Achievement_2004_2006.pdf
48. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2005, December 3). *UNMIL Quick Impact Projects Provide Bathroom Facilities and Water System to the Monrovia Central Prison* [Electronic version]. (UNMIL/PIO/PR/230). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr230.pdf>
49. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, March 15). *Fourteenth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/151). New York: United Nations.
50. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, May 12). *United Nations Force Commander visits free medical camp in Yeala* [Electronic version]. (Press Release 55). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/1article.asp?id=2205&zdoc=1>
51. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, January 30). *First all-female UN Police Contingent arrives in Liberia* [Electronic version]. (PR 10). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/1article.asp?id=1974&zdoc=1>
52. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, March 9). *UNMIL releases 2006 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Report* [Electronic version]. (PR 23). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/1article.asp?id=2051&zdoc=1>
53. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2007, August 1). *UNMIL reports significant drop in SEA cases for first half of this year* [Electronic version]. (PR 86). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/article.asp?id=2378>

54. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2008, February 8). *UN Envoy in Liberia commends India, as she welcomes new all-female police unit* [Electronic version]. (PR 10). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/1article.asp?id=2656&zdoc=1>
55. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping. UNMIL. (2008, January 2). *UNMIL releases SEA report, records 80 percent decrease in reported allegations* [Electronic version]. (PR 1). Retrieved August 2008 from <http://unmil.org/article.asp?id=2608>
56. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNMIT. Gender Affairs. (2007). *UNMIT Gender Affairs Unit Quarterly Report, October-December 2007*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://unmit.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ur6Jdq2nv7s%3d&tabid=434&mid=779>
57. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNMIT. Gender Affairs. (2007). *UNMIT Gender Affairs Unit Quarterly Report, July-September 2007*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://unmit.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=loJ2k%2bgAoQc%3d&tabid=434&mid=779>
58. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNMIT. Gender Affairs. (2008). *UNMIT Gender Affairs Unit Quarterly Report, January-March 2008*. Retrieved November 2008 from <http://unmit.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=B%2fJXTFGGrFBM%3d&tabid=434&mid=779>
59. United Nations. Development Fund for Women. (2004). *Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration* [Electronic version]. New York: United Nations. Retrieved February 2009 from http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Getting_it_Right_Doing_it_Right.pdf
60. United Nations. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. (n.d.). *Country Program: Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=25>
61. United Nations. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. (n.d.). *Country Program: Haiti*. Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80>
62. United Nations. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. (n.d.). *Country Program: Liberia*. Retrieved December 2008 from <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=52>

63. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (n.d.). *Liberia's Response to the Questionnaire to Governments on Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and the Outcome of the Twenty-Third Special Session of the General Assembly (2000)* [Electronic version]. Retrieved August 2008, from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/responses/LIBERIA-English.pdf>
64. United Nations. Economic and Social Council. (1997). *Report of the Economic and Social Council for the year 1997* [Electronic version]. (A/52/3/Rev. 1). New York: United Nations.
65. United Nations. Secretariat. (2003, October 9). *Special Measure for protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse* [Electronic version]. (ST/SGB/2003/13). New York: United Nations.
66. United Nations. Security Council. (1999, November 30). *Resolution 1279 (1999)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1279 1999). New York: United Nations.
67. United Nations. Security Council. (2000, February 24). *Resolution 1291 (2000)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1291 2000). New York: United Nations.
68. United Nations. Security Council. (2000, July 14). *Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General* [Electronic version]. (A/55/138). New York: United Nations.
69. United Nations. Security Council. (2000, July 14). *Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General* [Electronic version]. (S/2000/693). New York: United Nations.
70. United Nations. Security Council. (2000, June 12). *Third progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2000/566). New York: United Nations.
71. United Nations. Security Council. (2000, October 31). *Resolution 1325 (2000)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1325 2000). New York: United Nations.
72. United Nations. Security Council. (2001, June 8). *Eighth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2001/572). New York: United Nations.
73. United Nations. Security Council. (2001, October 16). *Ninth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2001/970). New York: United Nations.
74. United Nations. Security Council. (2002, June 5). *Eleventh progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2002/621). New York: United Nations.

75. United Nations. Security Council. (2002, October 18). *Twelfth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2002/1180). New York: United Nations.
76. United Nations. Security Council. (2003, December 15). *First progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2003/1175). New York: United Nations.
77. United Nations. Security Council. (2003, February 21). *Thirteenth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2003/211). New York: United Nations.
78. United Nations. Security Council. (2003, November 17). *Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2003/1098). New York: United Nations.
79. United Nations. Security Council. (2003, September 19). *Resolution 1509 (2003)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1509 2003). New York: United Nations.
80. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, April 30). *Resolution 1542 (2004)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1542 2004). New York: United Nations.
81. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, August 16). *Third special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/650). New York: United Nations.
82. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, December 31). *Sixteenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/1034). New York: United Nations.
83. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, November 18). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/908). New York: United Nations.
84. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, March 25). *Fifteenth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/251). New York: United Nations.
85. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, May 26). *Third progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/430). New York: United Nations.
86. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, October 13). *Women Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary General* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/814). New York: United Nations.

87. United Nations. Security Council. (2004, September 10). *Fourth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2004/725). New York: United Nations.
88. United Nations. Security Council. (2005). *Letter dated 9 February 2005 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/79). New York: United Nations.
89. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, August 2). *Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/506). New York: United Nations.
90. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, December 7). *Ninth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/764). New York: United Nations.
91. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, December 28). *Twentieth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/832). New York: United Nations.
92. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, February 25). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/124). New York: United Nations.
93. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, June 16). *Seventh progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/391). New York: United Nations.
94. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, March 15). *Seventeenth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/167). New York: United Nations.
95. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, May 13). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/313). New York: United Nations.
96. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, October 6). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/631). New York: United Nations.
97. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, September 1). *Eighth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/560). New York: United Nations.

98. United Nations. Security Council. (2005, September 26). *Nineteenth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2005/603). New York: United Nations.
99. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, April 20). *End Of Mandate Report Of The Secretary General On The United Nations Office In Timor-Leste (For The Period 14 January To 12 April 2006)* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/251). New York: United Nations.
100. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, August 8). *Report of the Secretary General covering major developments since the 20 April report and presenting recommendations on the future UN role in Timor-Leste* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/628). New York: United Nations.
101. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, August 25). *Resolution 1704 (2006)* [Electronic version]. (S/Res/1704 2006). New York: United Nations.
102. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, December 11). *Thirteenth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/958). New York: United Nations.
103. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, December 19). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Haiti* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/1003). New York: United Nations.
104. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, February 2). *Report of the Secretary General on MINUSTAH* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/60). New York: United Nations.
105. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, June 9). *Eleventh progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/376). New York: United Nations.
106. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, June 13). *Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/389). New York: United Nations.
107. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, June 13). *Twenty-first progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/390). New York: United Nations.
108. United Nations. Security Council. (2006, September 21). *Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2006/759). New York: United Nations.
109. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, August 8). *Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/479). New York: United Nations.

110. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, August 22). *Report of the Secretary General on MINUSTAH* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/503). New York: United Nations.
111. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, August 28). *Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIT (for the period from 27 January to 20 August 2007)* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/513). New York: United Nations.
112. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, February 7). *Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIT (for the period from 27 January to 20 August 2007)* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/50). New York: United Nations.
113. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, March 20). *Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/156). New York: United Nations.
114. United Nations. Security Council. (2007, November 14). *Twenty-fourth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2007/671). New York: United Nations.
115. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, April 2). *Twenty-fifth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/218). New York: United Nations.
116. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, August 27). *Report of the Secretary General on MINUSTAH* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/586). New York: United Nations.
117. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, January 17). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/26). New York: United Nations.
118. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, July 3). *Twenty-Sixth progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/433). New York: United Nations.
119. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, July 29). *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/501). New York: United Nations.
120. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, March 19). *Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/183). New York: United Nations.
121. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, March 26). *Report of the Secretary General on MINUSTAH* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/202). New York: United Nations.

122. United Nations. Security Council. (2008, September 25). *Women Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary General* [Electronic version]. (S/2008/622). New York: United Nations.
123. United Nations. United Nations Institute for Training and Research. (2003). *Training Program for Civilian Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Special Needs of Women and Children in Conflict* [Electronic version]. Kinshasa and Kisingani, Democratic Republic of the Congo: United Nations.
124. United Nations. United Nations Population Fund. (2005). *Gender-Based Violence in Timor-Leste, A Case Study* [Electronic version]. New York: United Nations. Retrieved December 2008 from http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/gbv_timorleste.pdf
125. Van Woudenberg, Anneke. (2004). *MONUC: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform*. Retrieved January 2009 from <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/02/28/monuc-case-peacekeeping-reform>
126. Waberi, Fathya. (2007, March 30). *First Training for Female Journalists in Maniema*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=14255>
127. Whittington, Sherrill. (2000). The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor: Gender affairs. *Development Bulletin*. 53. Retrieved March 2009 from http://devnet.anu.edu.au/GenderPacific/pdfs/16_gen_peace_whittington.pdf
128. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (2008). Gender and Peacekeeping: Some Facts. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/facts.html>
129. Yacoubian, Nina. (2008, April 9). *Female Journalists Plot their Way Forward*. Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=17051>
130. Yacoubian, Nina. (2008, March 17). *South Kivu: 14,200 cases of rape registered from 2005 to 2007*. Retrieved October 2008 from <http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=16896>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- African Rights. (2004). Broken Bodies, Torn Spirits: Living with Genocide, Rape, and HIV/AIDS. Retrieved May 2007 from http://www.womenwarpeace.org/webfm_send/351
- Baines, Erin K. (2001). You Cannot Dance If You Cannot Stand. Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. Retrieved May 2007 from <http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/rwi.pdf>
- Blizzard, Sarah M. (2006). Women's Roles in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Empowerment of Women in the Aftermath. Diss. Georgia Institute of Technology. Retrieved June 2007 from http://smartech.library.gatech.edu/bitstream/1853/11577/1/blizzard_sarah_m_200608_mast.pdf
- Bob, Clifford. (2005). The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, Henry & Richmond, Oliver. (2003). Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs. London: Frank Cass.
- Dobbins, James. (2007). A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping. Testimony Presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, RAND Corporation. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT284/>
- Junne, Gerd & Verkoren, Willemijn. (2005). Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2005.
- Lyytikäinen, Minna. (2007). Gender Training for Peacekeepers: Preliminary overview of United Nations peace support operations. Gender, Peace and Security Working Paper 4. Retrieved August 2008 from www.un-instraw.org/en/library/gender-peace-and-security/gender-training-for-peacekeepers-working-paper/download.html
- Martens, Kerstin. (2005). NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.

- Mvukiyehe, Eric. (2007). In Search of the Determinants for Successful United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Intrastate Conflicts Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA. Retrieved July 2008 from All Academic Database.
- Nzomo, Maria. (2002). Gender, Governance, and Conflicts in Africa. Retrieved October 2008 from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan008250.pdf>
- Prendergast, John & Cheadle, Don. (2007). Not On Our Watch: A Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. New York: Hyperion Books.
- Public Broadcasting Service. (2003, August 4). Online News Hour: Peace Mission. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec03/liberia_8-4.html
- Puechguirbal, Nadine. (2005). Gender and Peace building in Africa: Analysis of some structural obstacles. Gender and Peace building in Africa. Eds. Dina Rodriguez and Edith Natukunda-Togboa. Retrieved August 2008 from <http://www.africa.ucepeace.org/documents/GPB%20in%20Africa.pdf#page=16>
- Seybolt, Taylor. (2007). Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Singh, Anita Inger. (2007). Security and Development: Challenges for Donors. UN Chronicle Online Edition. Retrieved March 2009 from http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/062907_challenges_for_donors.htm
- Stewart, Frances. (n.d.). Development and Security, Working Paper 3. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE. Retrieved March 2009 from <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper3.pdf>
- United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2004). Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/GRP%20Full%20Version.pdf>
- United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2006). Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations. New York: United Nations. Retrieved February 2009 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/wps/Policy%20directive%20gender%20equality%20FINAL%202006.pdf>
- United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2007). Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping Contexts. Retrieved November 2008 from http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/PDF/Pretoria_concl.pdf

- United Nations. Department of Public Information and Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2008). In the Cause of Peace. With Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Retrieved August 2008 from: <http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/peace/inthecauseofpeace.rm>
- United Nations. Development Fund for Women. (2004). Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.womenwarpeace.org/webfm_send/278
- United Nations. International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. (2006). Securing Equality; Engendering Peace: a guide to policy and planning on women, peace and security. Retrieved July 2008 from <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/docs/1325/1325-Guide-ENG.pdf>
- United Nations. Security Council. (2000, April 18). Second progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2000/330). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2000, December 6). Fifth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2000/1156). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2000, May). Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action [Electronic version]. (A/55/138-S/2000/693). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2000, September 21). Fourth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2000/888). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2001, April 17). Seventh progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2001/373). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2001, February 12). Sixth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2001/128). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2001, October 31). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2001/31). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2001, October 16). Ninth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2001/970). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2002, February 15). Tenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2002/169). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2002, June 5). Eleventh progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2001/621). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2002, March 11). Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations [Electronic version]. (A/56/863). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2002, October 18). Twelfth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2002/1180). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2002, October 31). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2002/32). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2003, February 13). Gender-mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Activities: Report of the Secretary General's [Electronic version]. (A/57/731). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2003, February 21). Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2003/211). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2003, October 9). Secretary General's Bulletin on Special Measure for protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse [Electronic version]. (ST/SGB/2003/13). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, April 16). Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2004/300). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, August 30). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2004/698). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, December 17). Fifth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2004/972). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, March 22). Second progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2004/229). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, March 24). Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2004/251). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, May 26). Third progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2004/430). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, November 18). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2004/908). New York: United Nations.

United Nations. Security Council. (2004, October 28). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2004/40). New York: United Nations.

- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, December 28). Twentieth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2005/832). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, February 25). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2005/124). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, June 16). Seventh progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2005/391). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, March 15). Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2005/167). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, March 17). Sixth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2005/177). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, May 13). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2005/313). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, October 6). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2005/631). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, October 10). Report of the Secretary-General on Women Peace and Security [Electronic version]. (S/2005/636). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, October 27). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2005/52). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2005, September 26). Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2005/603). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, December 11). Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2006/958). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, December 19). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2006/1003). New York: United Nations.

- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, July 26). Report on justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste [Electronic version]. (S/2006/580). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, July 28). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [Electronic version]. (S/2006/592). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, June 13). Twenty-first progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2006/390). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, March 14). Tenth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2006/159). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, November 8). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2006/42). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, September 12). Twelfth progress report of the Secretary General on UNMIL [Electronic version]. (S/2006/743). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2006, September 27). Report of the Secretary-General on Women Peace and Security [Electronic version]. (S/2006/770). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2007, August 28). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 27 January to 20 August 2007) [Electronic version]. (S/2007/513). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2007, February 7). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 06 to January 2007) [Electronic version]. (S/2007/50). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2007, March 7). Statement by the President of the Security Council [Electronic version]. (S/PRST/2007/5). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2007, November 14). Twenty-fourth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2007/671). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2007, September 12). Report of the Secretary-General on Women Peace and Security [Electronic version]. (S/2007/567). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations. Security Council. (2008). Women targeted or affected by armed conflict: what role for military peacekeepers? Retrieved September 2008 from <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP914/pdfs/WP914.pdf>.

United Nations. Security Council. (2008, July 3). Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary General on MONUC [Electronic version]. (S/2008/433). New York: United Nations.

United States Institute of Peace. (2003). Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html

Whitman, Jim & Pocock, David (Eds.). (1996). After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.

Whittington, Sherrill. (2003). Gender and Peacekeeping: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. *Signs*. 28(4). Retrieved March 2009 from JSTOR database.

Whittington, Sherrill. (2004). Women and Post-War Reconstruction: Strategies for Implementation of Democracy Building Policies. Retrieved September 2008 from http://hon.fiu.edu/~conference/transcripts_5.doc

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (n.d.). Resolution 1325 Watch: Liberia. Retrieved August 2008 from http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325_Monitor/RW/Liberia.htm

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. (n.d.). Security Council 1325 Monitor. Retrieved July 2008 from http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325_Monitor/index.htm